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1992 / The Case of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines charges levied by Budd Company Wheel
and Brake Division [hereinafter Budd Company], a United States
manufacturer of tubeless steel disc wheels (TSDWs), that two
Brazilian competitors were dumping TSDWs into the U.S. market.'
Budd Company petitioned the Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration [hereinafter Commerce], and the
International Trade Commission (ITC) to assess an antidumping
duty against Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais [hereinafter
Borlem] and FNV-Veiculos E Equipamentos S.A. [hereinafter
FNV] to protect U.S. TSDW manufacturers from the harmful
effects of the alleged dumping. The ensuing investigations into
whether Borlem and FNV were actually dumping TSDWs into the
United States involved. legal, economic, and policy questions of
first impression.
2
Because of the complex legal and economic issues raised in
dumping cases, it is possible that a single case will be reviewed by
Commerce and the ITC, and appealed to the courts several times
before the issues are finally resolved. The case of Borlem S.A.-
Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States is an extreme example
of the procedural and substantive complexities involved in dumping
cases.' In an attempt to avoid the confusion which would result if
this article was presented in chronological order, the article is
structured so that each agency's investigations are presented
1. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (defming dumping); see also infra notes 60-
79 and accompanying text (describing the facts of the case).
2. See infra notes 5-59 and accompanying text (providing an overview of U.S. dumping
statutes and the economics of dumping).
3. This case adds new meaning to the legal phrase: "Who is suing whom for what?"
Originally, the case was brought to the International Trade Commission (ITC) under the caption:
Borlem S.A. Empreedimentos Industriais and FNV Veiculos E Equipamentos S.A plaintiffs v. United
States, defendani: The Budd Company, Wheel and Brake Division, defendant-intervenor, 10 I.T.ILD.
(BNA) 1623 (1988) (No. 87-06-00693) (Slip op. 88-77). Each time the case was remanded back to
Commerce, or the 1TC from the Court of International Trade (CIT) new administrative findings were
issued. These new administrative findings generated further reviews by the CIT and Court of Appeal
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). For example, as Commerce changed its position on the matter, the
parties' names, and pairings as plaintiff and defendant, shifted dramatically. FNV dropped out of
aspects of the litigation altogether based on an Amended Final Determination by Commerce.
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together, and each issue appealed to the courts is presented together
in a single section."
Part II provides an overview of U.S. antidumping statutes and
a review of the economics of dumping. Part III states the facts of
this case and describes the administrative proceedings. Part IV
traces the appeals of determinations made by Commerce. Part V
covers appeals resulting from ITC findings and decisions. Part VI
analyzes the legal ramifications of all the proceedings. Part VII
provides some concluding thoughts.
II. UN=ED STATES ANTIDUMPING STATUTES AND
THE ECONOMICS OF DUMPING
The first U.S. antidumping statutes were contained in the
Revenue Act of 1916.5 This original, antidumping legislation
eventually proved inadequate because it required proof that the
foreign company was intentionally dumping its products into the
United States." Therefore, Congress passed replacement legislation
in the form of the Antidumping Act of 1921.' Although
subsequently replaced, the Antidumping Act of 1921 was important
because it introduced many of the concepts which are contained in
current antidumping statutes.'
4. See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text (providing the procedural aspects of
investigations). The reader should note that many of the administrative proceedings and multiple
appeals to the courts were dependant on the outcome of another proceeding which occurred earlier
or which was being conducted simultancously.
5. Grey Bryan & Dominique Guy Boursereau, Antidumping Law in the European
Communities and The United States: A Comparative Analysis, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L & ECON.
631,655 (1985). The Revenue Act of 1916 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988). The legislation was
based in part on fears that pricing by German cartels, particularly chemical companies, would cause
injury to U.S. industries. Id.
6. Id,
7. Id, at 666; Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921), repealed by Trade
Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 StaLt. 144 (1979) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-1677 (1988)).
8. Bryan & Boursereau, supra note 5, at 666. Concepts introduced in the Antidumping Act
of 1921 include injury determinations, purchase price, exporter's sale price, and foreign market value.
Additionally, the Act introduced the bifurcated administrative process still in use today. Originally
the U.S. Treasury Department determined whether dumping was occurring and the U.S. Tariff
Commission determined whether the dumping resulted in injury to U.S. industry. Today those roles
are filled by the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission respectively.
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Due the growth of international trade in the last forty-five
years, countries have sought to harmonize their antidumping
remedies through multilateral agreements on the structure and form
of antidumping laws. Internationally, antidumping remedies are
authorized under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and the GATT Antidumping Code.9 The U.S., as a
signatory of GATT, currently has antidumping statutes that are
consistent with the GATT provisions.1" The United States has
adopted a bifurcated system which administered by Commerce and
the ITC. u"
A. Overview of U.S. Antidumping Statutes
As defined by GATT and U.S. antidumping law, dumping
occurs when a product manufacturer charges a lower price in the
export market than in the home market for similar merchandise,
after accounting for differences in sales conditions and merchandise
characteristics.12 Dumping is a form of predatory pricing by a
firm seeking to maximize profits through international price
discrimination. 3 Because the foreign manufacturer is selling
goods below cost, it is likely that domestic manufacturers will lose
Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Casefor Reconsideration, 22 TEX. INT'L LJ.
265, 269 (1987).
9. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, art. VI, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, A1365, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The Antidumping Code is a separate
document named, AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI oF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT
ON TARIFFs AND TRADE (ANIDUMPINO CODE), Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 18 .L.M. 621
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1980) reprinted in H.R. Doc. 96-153, Part I, 96th Cong. Sess. 309 (1979)
(relating to antidumping measures); see Michael Sandier, Primer on United States Trade Remedies,
19 INT'L LAw. 761, 763 (1985) (discussing statutory authorization for antidumping laws). As a
signatory, United States antidumping laws are predicated on GATT.
10. Bryan & Boursereau, supra note 5, at 668-69 (detailing movement towards international
approach to dumping problems).
11. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677k (Subtitle IV - Countervailing and Antidumping Duties). See
infra notes 16-41 and accompanying text (explaining the roles of Commerce and theITC).
12. Knoll, supra note 8, at 267; For the seminal work on dumping, see JACOB VINmR,
DuMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923); see also Richard D. Boltuck,An Economic
Analysis of Dumping, 21 . WoRLD TRADE L 45, 45-47 (1987).
13. Boltuck, supra note 12, at 45-47.
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market share and, finally, be driven from the market."4 Therefore,
antidumping remedies are designed to counteract the predatory
pricing practices of firms from other countries.15 Determining
whether an antidumping duty is warranted under U.S. law requires
entry into the administrative maze, created by Congress.
1. Substantive Aspects of Administrative Investigations
When Commerce begins an investigation, it seeks to establish
the foreign market value of such or similar merchandise by
discovering the sales price of the merchandise in the foreign firm's
domestic market.'6 If the merchandise is not sold or offered for
sale in the foreign firm's domestic market, Commerce looks at the
price at which the product is sold or offered for sale in countries
other than the United States. 7 Finally, if there are no sales to
third countries, the statute authorizes Commerce to utilize a
constructed value. 8 If dumping is found, Commerce then
establishes the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds
14. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing how dumping affects both U.S.
manufacturers and consumers).
15. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (describing the rationale behind antidumping
remedies and their impact on the dumping party).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (1988).
17. § 1677b(a)(1)(B). Commerce may also look at sales in third countries if sales in the firm's
domestic market are too small for comparison.
18. § 167Th(a)(2) (permitting the use of constructed value). § 1677b(e)(1) provides that the
constructed value determination shall be the sum of:
(A) the cost of materials... and of fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in
producing such or similar merchandise, at a time preceding the date of exportation of the
merchandise under consideration which would ordinarily permit the production of that particular
merchandise in the ordinary course of business;
(B) an amount for general expenses and profit equal to that usually reflected in sales of
merchandise of the same general class or kind as the merchandise under consideration which
are made by producers in the country of exportation, in the usual commercial quantities and in
the ordinary course of trade, except that-
(i) the amount for general expenses shall not be less than 10 percent of the cost as defined
in subparagraph (A), and
(Hi) the amount for profit shall not be less than 8 percent of the sum of such general
expenses and cost; and
(C) the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other expenses incidental
to placing the merchandise under consideration in condition, packed ready for shipment to the
Untied States.
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the price of the product in the United States (this is called the
"dumping margin"). 9 The finding of dumping and the fixing of
the dumping margin establishes only one of the two requirements
necessary for imposition of an antidumping duty.
The objective of the ITC investigation is to discover whether
the dumping has caused, or threatens to cause, material injury"
to a U.S. industry. 21 Any finding of threatened injury must be
based on evidence that the threat of material injury is real and
actual injury imminent, and not merely based on conjecture or
supposition.' Additionally, sufficient grounds to impose an
antidumping duty exist if the ITC determines that a U.S. industry
may be materially retarded by foreign dumping.2 An ITC finding
of material retardation of a U.S. industry occurs when it is
discovered that an industry did not develop in the United States
due to the dumping of imports.24 The governing statutes direct the
ITC to consider various factors in the course of its investigation.25
19. § 1673b(b)(1)(A) (Preliminary); § 1673d(c)(2) (Issuance of Antidumping Duty Order).
20. "The term 'material injury' means harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant." § 1677(7)(A).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1988); see N. David Palmeter, Dumping Margins and Material
Injury: The USITC Is Free to Choose, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L 173 (1987) (Commission has broad
discretion in using dumping margins to determine injury). "The term 'industry' means the domestic
producers as a whole of a like product, or those producers whose collective output of the like product
constitutes a major portion of the total domestic production of that product .... .- § 1677(4)(A).
22. § 1677C7)(F)(Ci).
23. § 1673(2)(B).
24. Certain Dried Salted Codfish from Canada, US1TC Pub. 1711, Inv. No. 731-TA-199, at
4-5, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2353, 2355 (1985) (final); Knoll, supra note 8, at 49.
25. See, eg., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(a), 1673d(b), 1677(7). Generally, the ITC must consider in
each case:
(1) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation,
(H) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for like products,
and
(ll) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of the like products, but
only in the context of production operations within the United States.
§ 1677(7)(B)(i).
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2. The Administrative Process
Usually, a dumping investigation begins when an interested
party,26 such as Budd Company, files with both Commerce and
the ITC a petition alleging dumping and material injury.2
However, Commerce may initiate an investigation ab initio
whenever the facts warrant.2" After the investigation is initiated,
the ITC has forty-five days to conclude whether there is a
reasonable indication that a U.S. industry has suffered injury due
to imports of the goods under investigation.29 If the ITC makes an
affirmative preliminary finding, Commerce ordinarily has 160 days
to reach a preliminary determination whether the foreign goods are
being dumped into the United States.30 If Commerce reaches an
26. An interested party, as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b), which refers to § 1677(9)(C), (D),
(E), (F), or (G) respectively, which includes: a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United
States of a like product; a certified union; a trade association marketing a like product in the United
States; an association with a majority of members as described in §§ (C-(E); an industry engaged
in producing a processed agricultural product.
27. § 1673a(b)(2) (A party must file petitions with Commerce and the ITC simultaneously).
For a more detailed discussion of the procedural process under U.S. antidumping statutes, see Bryan
& Boursereau, supra note 5, at 682-90.
28. § 1673a(a), (b) (providing the procedures for initiating an antidumping investigation).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b). The statute states that:
... the Commission [ITC], within 45 days after the date on which the petition is filed.
. . or on which it receives notice from the administering authority [Commerce] of an
investigation commenced [ab initio by Commerce], shall make a determination, based on
the best available information available to it at the time of the determination, of whether
there is a reasonable indication that-
(1) an industry in the United States-
(A) is materially injured, or
(B) is threatened with material injury, or
(2) the establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded,
... If that [the ITC's conclusions] are negative, the investigation shall be terminated. Id.
30. § 1673b(b)(1)(A). The statute states that:
.. within 160 days after the date on which a petition is filed.., but not before an
affirmative [preliminary] determination by the Commission... the administering authority
[Commerce] shall make a determination, based upon the best information available to it
at the time of the determination, of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or
suspect that the merchandise is being sold, or likely to be sold, at less than fair market
value.
Id; see § 1673b(b)(1)(B) (shortening the maximum time to 120 days or 100 days from date of the
ITC's preliminary determination); see also § 1673b(c)(1) (extending the maximum time to no more
than 210 days in extraordinarily complicated cases).
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affirmative dumping determination, it forwards all information
obtained in the investigation to the ITC for use in its subsequent
final injury investigation.31 After the preliminary investigations are
complete, then the agencies conduct final investigations.
Commerce must issue a final determination of whether foreign
manufacturers are dumping goods into the U.S. market within
seventy-five days of the preliminary determination, unless a sixty-
day extension is granted.32  Commerce's final dumping
determination precedes the beginning of the ITC's final injury
investigation.33 If either agency's final investigations result in
negative dumping or injury findings, the administrative process
ends.' If final affirmative determinations of dumping and material
injury are reached by Commerce and the ITC, Commerce will
publish a final antidumping duty order to the United States
Customs Service authorizing the imposition of an antidumping duty
on the foreign merchandise.35
The short time limitations contained in U.S. antidumping
statutes reveal Congress' desire to move the administrative process
along rapidly. Rapid dumping and injury determinations by the
administrative agencies were designed to benefit both foreign and
31. See § 1673b(d) (stating the effect of determination by administering authority).
32. § 1673d(a)(1). The statute states:
General Rule.-Within 75 days after the date of its preliminary determination under
section 1673(b) . . . the administering authority [Commerce] shall make a final
determination of whether the merchandise which was the subject of the investigation is
being, or is likely to be sold in the United States at less than its fair value."
kd; see § 1673d(a)(2) (allowing an extension of period for determination).
33. § 1673d(b)(2). The statute states:
Period for injury determination following affirmative preliminary determination by
administering authority [Commerce] ... before the later of-
(A) the 120th day after the day on which the administering authority makes its
affirmative preliminary determination... or
(3) the 45th day after the day on which the administering authority makes its
affirmative final determination ....
Id. According to 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(3), if Commerce's preliminary determination is negative but
its final determination is affirmative, then the 1TC shall have 75 days after the date of the final
affirmative determination to issue its final determination. Id
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(3).
35. § 1673e (Assessment of duty). If Commerce reaches an affirmative preliminary
determination, it will order the suspension or liquidation of entries of all merchandise subject to the
order, and require a bond or cash deposit to secure potential antidumping duties. § 1673b(d)(1), (2).
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domestic manufacturers, by providing them with a swift resolution
of their disputes. 6 However, the administrative process described
above may not resolve the dispute for the parties as the decisions
of Commerce and the ITC are subject to appeal in federal court.
Final affirmative findings or preliminary negative findings of
Commerce or the ITC are appealable to the United States Court of
International Trade (Cfl').37 The CIT's scope of review is limited
to matters occurring within the administrative process.38 The
standard of court review is extremely deferential to the decisions
of Commerce and the ITC.39 Parties may appeal a decision of the
CIT to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)4 ° and
ultimately, if certiorari is granted, to the United States Supreme
Court.
4'
B. The Economics of Dumping
Dumping is defined as the sale of foreign merchandise in the
United States at less than fair value.42 The foreign market value
36. Foreign manufacturers found to be dumping can adjust their pricing policies accordingly.
See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. Domestic manufacturers gain quick relief from unfair
foreign pricing before further injury occurs.
37. § 1516a(l)-(2); see William E. Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United
States International Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L LJ. 345, 386 (1985) (formerly named the
United States Customs Court, the name changed to CIT and was given exclusive jurisdiction under
§ 1516a in 1980); see also, RALPH H. FOLSOM, INTERNArToNAL Busnqss TRANSACTnONS 498 (CIT
is an Article I court with exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over civil matters commenced by or
against the United States and authority to review administrative agency decisions).
38. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2); Perry, supra note 37, at 386 (CIT cannot decide cases on
the basis of new evidence or a de novo review of record).
39. § 1516a(b)(1) (Standards of review). Reviews of Commerce's decision not to initiate an
investigation, the ITC's decision not to review a determination based on changed circumstances, or
a negative preliminary determination by the ITC are upheld unless they are arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The standard of review for all
determinations on the record, § 1516a(2), are upheld unless they are unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.
40. Perry, supra note 37, at 386 (CAFC is formerly known as the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims).
41. Id. at 386-87.
42. Tariff Act of 1930, amended by, Pub. L. 98-573, Title VI, § 602(b) 98 Stat 3024 (1984)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)) [hereinafter all references to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended
will be to the codification in the United States Code]; see, Michael S. Knoll, An Economic Approach
To the Determination of Injury Under the United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Law,
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of such or similar merchandise43 exported to the United States is
considered the merchandise's fair value.' To determine if
dumping has occurred, market prices in both the United States and
the foreign market must be analyzed.' To have a fair basis for
comparing prices, both the foreign and domestic manufacture's
prices for the merchandise are reduced to the factory cost.46 The
cost of the merchandise in the foreign country is then converted
into U.S. dollars for purposes of comparison.' Dumping occurs
when the ex-factory price of the foreign merchandise sold in the
United States is less than the ex-factory price charged for such or
similar merchandise sold in the foreign manufacturer's own
domestic market.48
Dumping is generally considered a form of international price
discrimination.49 Specifically, price discrimination is a function of
the manufacturer selling such or similar products at different prices
in different markets.5" For a firm to engage in price discrimination
three conditions must be met: (1) the firm's home market and
foreign market are separable, (2) the firm can raise prices without
losing sales, and (3) the demand for the product differs in the
22 N.Y.U. L INT'L L. & POL. 37, pt. 11A (1989) (defining dumping); David M. Repp, Note,
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: Protection at a Cost, 15 J. CORP. L 65, pt. II.B (1989)
(discussing antidumping as an unfair trade barrier).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) generally deftmes"Such or similar merchandise" as:
The merchandise which is the subject of an investigation and other merchandise which
is identical in physical characteristics with, and was produced in the same country by the
same person as, that merchandise.
44. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.42, A6 (as determined by Commerce); Knoll, supra note 42, at 42.
45. Sandier, supra note 9, at 763.
46. Knoll, supra note 42, at 42.
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d); Sandier, supra note 9, at 764.
48. Sandier, supra note 9, at 763; Knoll, supra note 42, at 43.
49. Boltuck, supra note 12, at 45-46.
The chief competing explanation of dumping is that it is a form of predatory pricing.
Although this belief is closely tied to the origin of antidumping statutes in Canada, the
United States, and some other countries, many economists doubt that predatory pricing
is a frequent phenomenon.
Id. at 46 n.7. Predatory dumping occurs when a foreign frum discriminates in favor of some foreign
buyers temporarily, in order to lower the market price, win market share, and eliminate competitors
before raising its prices after the competition is no longer in the market. P. LINDET, ITERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS 183 (8th ed. 1986).
50. Boltuck, supra note 12, at 46; LINDERT, supra note 49, at 184-85.
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firm's home and foreign markets.51 When the conditions make it
feasible, price discrimination results in a firm maximizing its
profits.
52
When a foreign firm dumps products in the United States,
domestic producers that cannot compete at the lower prices will be
driven from the market.5 3 U.S. consumers initially enjoy lower
prices due to the dumping of foreign merchandise.54 However,
after the U.S. firms are driven from the market, the foreign firm
will recoup any losses by charging a higher price for its
merchandise. 5 Antidumping duties are designed to eliminate the
impact of a foreign firm's attempts at dumping.
After determining that dumping is occurring, customs officers
are directed to assess an antidumping duty equal to the amount by
which the foreign market value of the merchandise exceeds the
U.S. price for such or similar merchandise.5 6 The antidumping
duty is not intended to punish the foreign firm; rather, it is intended
to force the foreign firm to cease its dumping practices. When
dumping is no longer feasible, a profit maximizing firm will raise
the price of its merchandise sold in the U.S. while simultaneously
lowering the price domestically." Eventually, the foreign producer
51. Boltuck, supra note 12, at 46-47. A profit-maximizing firm will price discriminate when:
(1) Markets are separable. This means customers purchasing the same product in different
markets cannot trade among themselves, thereby equalizing the price through arbitrage;
(2) The firm has market power in at least some markets. Market power means the firm
will not lose all sales if it raises its price. (Monopoly is the extreme case of market
power.) Raising the price will have two effects on the revenue of such a firm: it will
increase due to the higher unit price, but fall due to smaller sales volume; and
(3) The demand curves for different markets have different elasticities. Demand elasticity
is the percentage change in quantity purchased caused by a one per cent increase in price.
It is generally negative. This means customers are more responsive to price changes in
some markets than in others. The firm will charge a lower price in the market where
customers are more price responsive. Id
52. LirDmRT, supra note 49, at 184-85; see infra figs. 1, 2, at 197, 199 (illustrating the firm's
profit maximizing behavior).
53. Knoll, supra note 42, at 71.
54. Id.
55. Id.; R. IpSELs r Al., EcoNoMIcs 790, 800 (7th ed. 1984).
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(e).
57. Badger-Powhatan, Div. of Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985) (holding that the antidumping law is remedial not punitive); Perry, supra note 37, at 38 1.
58. See Boltuck, supra note 12, at 48.
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FIGURE 1
DUMPING
Price ($ per Unit)
Foreign Firm's Home Market
Marginal Cost
S1 0
Quantity Sold in Home Marke (Units Per Year)
United States Market
0 xi
Quantity Sold in United States
The price-discriminating monopolist maximizes profits by equating marginal revenue
(MR) in each market with marginal cost. The firm will charge a higher price in the
market where the demand curve it individually faces is less elastic (steeper). In this case,
that is the foreign firm's home market. In the more competitive U.S. market, with a more
elastic demand curve, it charges less. It can get away with such discrimination only if
there is no way for buyers in the high-price country to obtain the product from the other
countries, and if policy makers do not retaliate.
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will charge a single price, falling between the original domestic and
U.S. prices."'
Antidumping duties serve two purposes: first, they protect
domestic industry and jobs in the short run from the effects of
unfair pricing from abroad, and second, they protect the consumer
from paying higher prices in the long run. In theory, antidumping
statutes are designed to even the playing field between fbreign
firms dumping products and domestic firms facing the prospect of
losing market share due to unfair foreign pricing practices.
However, under the facts of a given case, it can be very difficult
to discover whether dumping is actually occurring. Furthermore, it
can be equally hard to conclude whether injury to U.S. industry, if
any, results from dumping or some other cause. As the facts of this
case illustrate, reaching a correct result is a difficult and time-
consuming task.
III. THE FACTS
The two Brazilian companies, Borlem and FNV, were exporting
TSDWs6° to the United States. TSDWs are used with pneumatic
tires on class 6, 7, and 8 trucks, buses, tractors, and semi-
trailers. 61 Budd Company obtained price quotes in the Brazilian
59. Id.; see IUNDERT, supra note 49, at 185-86; see figs. 1, 2, at 197, 199 (illustrating the
effects of antidumping duty on the U.S.).
60. According to the July 1976 Investigative report Tubeless Steel Disk Wheels From Brazil,
No. 731-TA-335 (preliminary) US1TC Pub. 1872, [hereinafter ITC Preliminary Investigation]:
A TSDW consists of a rim and a steel disc, produced separately and then welded together.
The rim holds the tubeless tire in place and the disc both centers the rim and attaches the
rim to the axle. TSDWs complement the longer tire life and stability of a tubeless radial
tire.
61. Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value; Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels
From Brazil, 51 Fed. Reg. 46,904, 46,905 (Inv. No. A-351-606) (Dec. 29, 1986) [hereinafter
Commerce Preliminary Determination]. There are two segments to the TSDW market in the United
States: (1) the larger original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) producing trucks and semi-trailers;
and (2) distributors selling to the aftermarket and small OEMs. Sales of Brazilian TSDW's were
made primarily to distributors in the aftermarket. However, Budd Company reported indications that
Brazilian producers were seeking to expand into the OEM market. Petition for the Imposition of
Antidumping Duties Under 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a) on Behalf of The Budd Company Wheel and Brake
Division at 10, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade
Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (May 23, 1986) (Non-Confidential Version) [hereinafter Petition].
1992 / The Case of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil
FIGURE 2





The effects of a small antidumping duty to offset injury are illustrated in this figure,
which magnifies the right side of Figure 1. A duty of $20 shifts the U.S. demand curve
down by this amount, with a corresponding effect on the marginal revenue curve
pertaining to the U.S. markeL The foreign monopolist finds that profits are now
maximized where the new marginal revenues match the marginal costs of extra output at
Point A. Therefore, the price is lowered from $180 to $170. Consumers respond by
buying fewer sets at the now higher domestic U.S. price of $170 plus the $20 duty, or
$190. The United States gains and loses from its duty. The loss is the efficiency loss on
the extra sets no longer purchased, or the triangle marked with a minus sign. The United
States gains the markdown on the price of the sets that continued to be imported, or the
rectangle defined by points B, C, D, and E. As drawn here the gains exceed the losses for
the United States. For the world, however, the antidumping duty is still a net loss, since
the aforementioned rectangle is not a world gain but just a redistribution from the foreign
firm to the United States.
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market and compared them with prices charged in the United States
for the same or similar TSDWs. Budd Company concluded that
Borlem and FNV were selling TSDWs in the U.S. market with
dumping margins of up to 160%.62 Therefore, on May 23, 1986,
Budd Company filed a petition on behalf of domestic
manufacturers63 of TSDWs with Commerce and the ITC alleging
that the Brazilian companies were dumping TSDWs into the U.S.
market."
Budd Company alleged that the U.S. TSDW industry had been
materially injured due to sales of Brazilian TSDWs at less than fair
value.61 Supporting the argument that the U.S. TSDW industry
was materially injured was evidence that, while consumption of
TSDWs declined by 7% from 1984 to 1985, Brazilian imports grew
1150% in the same period.' In one year, the percentage of
Brazilian imports in the U.S. TSDW market increased from 0.2%
to 6%.' The petition alleged that Borlem and FNV increased their
62. Petition, supra note 61, at 16.
Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels From Brazil
Estimated LTFV Margins
Size FM V-Brazil U.S.Price* Difference LTFV
24.5'x8.25* $ 132.32** $ 50.88 $ 81.44 160%
22.5'x8.25' 127.75 49.58 78.17 157%
22.5'x8.25' 111.63 49.58 62.05 125%
22.5'x8.25' 118.33 49.58 68.75 138%
* U.S. price is as calculated above from importer prices in effect November 1985.
** Budd estimate based upon known cost differential for larger size wheel.
Id.
63. The domestic industry consisted of three manufacturers: Budd Company, Firestone Steel
Products Division (a wholly owned subsidiary of Firestone Tire & Rubber Company), and Motor
Wheel Corp. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Goodyear The & Rubber Company). Petition, supra note
61, at 3; Commerce Preliminary Investigation, supra note 61, at 46,904.
64. Petition, supra note 61, at 1-17; Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at
46,904.
65. Petition, supra note 61, at 18 (material injury determination to be made by the ITC).
66. Id. note 61, at 18-19. In 1984, Brazilian imports represented 10,000 units sold out of a
total market of 2.25 million. In 1985, Brazilian imports represented 125,000 units sold out of a total
market of 2.1 million. Id.
67. Id. at 19. Over the four year period from 1983 to 1986, the percentage of Brazilian
imports into the U.S. TSDW market increased from essentially zero in 1983 to an estimated 8.3
percent in 1986. Id.
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market share in the United States by underpricing U.S. TSDW
manufacturers." Budd Company claimed that as a direct result of
underpricing by Borlem and FNV, the U.S. TSDW industry had
experienced declines in sales, shipments, production, employment,
and capacity utilization.69 Furthermore, Budd Company alleged
that there was a continuing threat of material injury to the U.S.
TSDW industry.
There were three principle reasons for the assertion that there
was a continuing threat of material injury to the U.S. TSDW
industry. First, a published report70 stated that Borlem was
planning a $15 million expenditure to modernize and expand its
wheel making capability.7 The planned expansion would increase
Borlem's monthly production of truck wheels from 65,000 units in
68. Id. at 19-20.
U.S. PRICE COMPARISONS
(Borlem vs. Domestic, truckload quantities)
Size Borlem Budd Variance Percentage
22.5'x 8.25' $52.42 $58.50 $6.08 10.3%
24.5'x 8.25' 53.54 60.45 6.91 11.4%
Motor Wheel and Firestone
22.5'x 8.25' 52.42 58.48* 6.06 10.3%
24.5'x 8.25' 53.54 59.66* 6.12 10.2%
* Includes a .75 centwheel pallet charge.
U.S. PRICE COMPARISONS
(FNV vs. Domestic, truckload quantities)
Size FNV Budd Variance Percentage
22.5"x 8.25" $47.50 $58.50 $11.08 18.7%
24.5'x 8.25' 50.00 60.45 10.45 17.2%
Motor Wheel and Firestone
22.5'x 8.25' 47.50 58.48* 10.98 18.7%
24.5'x 8.25' 50.00 59.60* 9.66 16.1%
* Includes a .75 cent/wheel pallet charge.
Id. at 19-20.
69. Id. at 20-21. The TSDW industry produces an essentially fungible line of products, and
persistent undercutting in price by one manufacturer has a severe and direct impact on competition.
Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 23 (citing a Brazilian publication, GAXETA MERCANTIL, Aug. 8, 1985).
71. Id.
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1985 to 85,000 units by 1987.72 Because the United States was
the largest market in the world for TSDWs, Budd Company
anticipated a large percentage of the increased production would be
exported from Brazil to the United States.73 Second, the U.S.
market demand for TSDWs was flat, while Brazilian market share
was increasing due to efforts by Borlem and FNV to undercut the
prices of U.S. manufacturers.74 Brazilian market share was
expected to increase as new Brazilian production capacity came on
line.75 Third, as Brazilian market share increased, continued
predatory pricing by Borlem, and FNV would further undercut the
market price, thereby suppressing the market for U.S.
manufacturers.76 The alleged material injury and threat of
continuing material injury resulting from the sales of TSDWs from
Brazil prompted Budd Company to request that Commerce initiate
an antidumping investigation pursuant to U.S. antidumping
statutes.77 The preliminary and final determinations of Commerce
and the ITC in this case are discussed below.
Under U.S. law, the ITC first makes a preliminary dumping
finding whether an actual or threatened material injury to, or
retardation of, a U.S. industry exists. Then Commerce conducts a
preliminary investigation to determine whether the foreign
manufacturers are dumping products into the United States.
7
After the ITC and Commerce report their preliminary analyses,
each agency then conducts a second round of investigations
resulting in a final determination."
72. Petition, supra note 61, at 23.
73. Id. at 23-24.
74. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
75. Petition, supra note 61, at 24.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)).
78. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. However, for purposes of organizing this
article, Commerce's and the ITC's preliminary and final investigations arb presented together to better
represent the processes of each agency.
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A. Commerce's Investigation of Borlem and FNV
After the petition was filed by Budd Company, Commerce
initiated an investigation of sales of the TSDWs by Borlem and
FNV for the period December 1, 1985 through May 31, 1986.80
Commerce requested financial information on both companies'
costs of production.81 Borlem and FNV filed responses to
questionnaires sent by Commerce explaining why there was no
dumping by either Brazilian manufacturer. Both Borlem and FNV
reported that there was a forty-five day delay between the date a
TSDW sale was made and the shipment date of the TSDWs to the
United States. 2 Commerce requested that both Borlem and FNV
present financial information utilizing Commerce's "replacement"
cost accounting methodology rather than the Brazilian "historical"
cost basis. 3  Borlem and FNV submitted information to
Commerce detailing their respective sales of TSDWs and the costs
of production. From the information provided by Borlem and FNV,
Commerce attempted to determine whether Brazilian manufactured
TSDWs were being dumped into the U.S. market.
1. Commerce's Preliminary Investigation
Borlem reported to Commerce that it sold TSDWs in the
Brazilian market. However, Borlem stated that sales of TSDWs in
Brazil were very limited and not made on a sustained basis until
late 1985.14 Additionally, Borlem reported that sales of TSDWs
in the U.S. market were in the after-purchase market, while sales
in Brazil were in the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
80. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 46,905.
81. Id.
82. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of time delays).
83. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 46,905. See infra notes 87-92 and
accompanying text (reasons for variation in accounting systems).
84. Response of Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industrias at 2, in the matter of Tubeless Steel
Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Intl Trade Admin. (Inv. No. A-351-606) (Aug. 25,1986) (Non-
Confidential Version) [hereinafter Response of Borlem].
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market because there were no significant after-market sales in
Brazil.8 5 Nevertheless, Borlem contended that the Brazilian sales
prices reported to Commerce were the best measure of Borlem's
actual performance in Brazil's hyperinflationary86 economy.87
85. Id. at 1-2.
Quantity and Value of Sales
(Dec. 1, 1985 through May 1, 1986)
Market Terms of Sale Units Total Value
U.S. C.LF. 20,000 U.S. $ 800,000
Brazil Delivered 14,000 Cz 8,000,000*
Canada C.I.F. 900 U.S. $ 40,000
* Sales in the Brazilian market were denominated in both cruzeiros and cruzados during
the period of review. All cruzeiro amounts were converted to cruzado amounts by dividing
the cruzeiro figure by 1000 to provide a consistent currency.
Id. at 6.
86. See DAVID W. PEARCE, THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICs 202 (3d. ed.
1986) [hereinafter MIT DICTIONARY]. Inflation is defined as: "A sustained rise in the general price
level The proportionate rate of increase in the general price level per unit of time." Xd.
Hyperinflation is defined as: "A position of rapidly accelerating inflation. Under conditions of
hyperinflation prices rise 10 or even 100 fold in a single month.... The exact boundary between
inflation and hyperinflation is difficult to define." Id. at 186; see MELTON FRIEMAN, STuDIES IN THE
QUANTrrY THEORY OF MONEY ch.2 (1956); CAoEN, THE MONErARY DYNAMICS OF HYPEIuNFLATION
25-117 (a seminal work on the study of money and hyperinflation) [hereinafter DYNAMIcs OF
HYPR .WFLATON].
87. Supplemental Response of Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais at 1, in the matter of
Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin. (Inv. No. A-351-606) (Dec.
5,1986) (Non-Confidential Version) [hereinafter Supplemental Response ofBorlem]. Borlem argued
that it was necessary to develop an accounting system based on -replacement costs" and make
adjustments to those elements of actual costs that reflect Borlem's effort to operate in a
hyperinflationary economy. Id. at 1-2.
General, selling, and administrative expenses were also impacted by the use of "replacement
cost" accounting because these expenses were taken as a ratio to cost of goods sold. Applying the
same ratios to replacement costs would substantially overstate the actual cost per unit. Id. at 5.
Use of replacement cost assumes no cost of carrying raw materials, semi-finished products, or
finished product inventory. Therefore, all carrying costs of inventory were eliminated from the cost
calculation. Consequently, short-term working capital financial costs attributed to production or
inventory carrying costs were eliminated from financial costs. Id. at 5-6; MIT DICTONARY, supra
note 86, at 202-03. Inflation accounting:
Refers to techniques for dealing with the impact of inflation on accounts and accounting
procedures. Traditionally, historic cost methods have been employed whereby accounts
were built up from actual records of transactions. In periods of rapid inflation the
replacement cost of fixed assets would greatly exceed historic costs. Consequently in real
terms depreciation will be understated when historic cost accounting is employed, and
profits overstated. The system of capital allowances may then not permit the recovery of
capital cost in real terms.... The Sandilands Committee... recommended the use of
value accounting whereby assets were to be measured by reference to their value and not
cost. The use of replacement cost accounting whereby assets are revalued from historic
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Borlem argued that based on the pricing of TSDWs sold in the
Brazilian market, it was not dumping TSDWs into the U.S. market.
In its comment on Borlem's response to Commerce's
questionnaire, Budd Company argued that Commerce should
continue its investigation of Borlem."8 Budd Company's analysis
indicated that Borlem's sales of TSDWs within the Brazilian
market were made in sufficient quantity to constitute a viable
market for measuring whether sales prices were above the cost of
production.89 However, Budd Company also asserted that Borlem
sold TSDWs in Brazil below the cost of production.9" Budd
Company disputed the "replacement cost" methodology employed
by Borlem in calculating actual costs of production.9" Ultimately,
Commerce found Borlem's domestic market sale prices were below
the cost of production.' Because the sales price in Brazil did not
reflect Borlem's production costs, and there were no reported third
country sales, Commerce was forced to construct a foreign market
value for the TSDWs manufactured by Borlem.
to current costs was recommended.... Three adjustments to trading profits calculated at
historic basis are required to arrive at current cost operating profit. The first is the
depreciation adjustment which allows for the impact of price changes when determining
the charge against revenue for the part of fixed assets consumed in the period. The second
is the cost of sales adjustment which allows for the impact of price changes when
determining the charge against revenue for stock consumed in the period. The third is the
monetary working capital adjustment which represents the amount of additional (or
reduced) financed needed for monetary working capital as a result of changes in the input
prices of goods and services employed in the business. Id.
88. Petitioner's Comment on Borlem's Response at 1-2, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc
Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin, Inv. No. A-351-606 (Sept. 16, 1986) (Non-
Confidential Version) [hereinafter Comment on Borlem's Response].
89. Petitioner's Comment on Borlem's Supplemental Response to Costs Questionnaire at 3,
in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels From Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-
351-606 (Dee. 3, 1986) (Non-Confidential Version) [hereinafter Comment on Cost]. When home
market sales of the same or similar merchandise which is the subject of investigation exceeds five
percent of third country sales, the home market is a viable market for establishing a fair market value.
Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 353.4(a)).
90. Response of Borlem, supra note 84, at 1-2.
91. Letter from Petitioner to Commerce at 1, (Dec. 16, 1986)
Respondents [Borlem and FNV] seek to minimize the consequences of replacement
cost accounting by the use of unwarranted adjustments to their financial and SG&A
expenses under the guise of adjustments consistent with the concept of replacement costs.
... [Tihe only appropriate adjustment to such costs is for the extraordinary costs of
carrying pre-purchased raw material inventory. Id. at 4.
92. Id.
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As with Borlem, FNV sold TSDWs in the U.S. market to
distributors in the truck wheel after-sales market and not to
OEMs.93 Unlike Borlem, which sold TSDWs in Brazil, FNV only
sold tube-type wheels in the Brazilian market.94 Additionally,
FNV recorded no third country sales in the period between
December 1, 1985 through May 31, 1986.95 However, FNV stated
that Commerce should expand its period of investigation to include
two sales of TSDWs to Canada on November 26, 1985 and in July
1986.96 FNV argued that the TSDWs sold to Canada were
identical to the ones sold in the U.S. market and would provide a
better comparison for purposes of computing foreign market
value.97 FNV's motion to expand the period of investigation
garnered a strong objection from Budd Company.98
Budd Company stated that FNV's motion to expand the
investigatory period was unnecessary and ill advised because the
motion was unsupported by a showing of reasonable cause.99
93. Response ofFNV-Veiculos EEquipamentos S.A. at 1, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc
Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (Aug. 11, 1986) (Non-
Confidential Version) [hereinafter Response of FNV].
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. Id. Expanding the investigatory period to include sales to Canada would result in the
following sales being recorded:
Quantity and Value of Sales
Market Terms Units Value
U.S. CIF 45,000 $ 2,000,000
Canada CIF 2,000 $ 125,000
Brazil 0 $ 0
Id. at 3.
97. Id. at 2-3. FNV stated that:
Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the antidumping statute and the
Departments [sic] regulations contain a strong preference for using price-to-price
comparisons whenever possible. Section 773 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a); 19 C.F.R. § 353.4 (b). Second, Canadian prices have been
consistent since August 1985 and therefore provide a stable and reliable basis for foreign
market value to compare with U.S. prices. Third, the Department has used sales outside
its chosen period of investigation in other cases. For all these reasons, the Department
should use Canadian sales to determine foreign market value is [sic] this investigation.
Id. at 3.
98. Petitioner's Comment on FNVs Response at 1, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc
Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (Aug. 20, 1986) [hereinafter
Comment on FNV Response].
99. Id. at 2.
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Budd Company disputed FNV's contention that there was a public
policy preference favoring expansion of the investigatory period in
order to provide price to price comparisons in determining foreign
market value."° Finally, Budd Company argued that it was
especially inappropriate to expand the investigatory period when
the foreign manufacturer operates in a hyperinflationary
economy." 1 Additionally, Budd Company contended that FNV
wanted to use Canadian sales in order to avoid disclosing the cost
of production information Commerce required to construct foreign
market value.1" Budd Company believed that the cost of
production information would reveal rapidly rising costs due to
hyperinflation, creating a greater likelihood that Commerce would
conclude FNV was dumping TSDWs in the U.S. market.
10 3
In reporting cost information to Commerce, FNV noted that the
investigatory period covered three fimancial statement periods due
to the Brazilian government's attempt to end hyperinflation through
implementation of the Cruzado Plan'" on February 28, 1986.105
100. Id. at 2. Budd Company further argued that there were only three grounds to expand the
investigatory period, and that FNV did not satisfy any of the three grounds. The three grounds for
expanding the investigatory period cited by Budd Company were:
1) the period is only enlarged at petitioner's suggestion or on the Department's own
initiative because of the particular facts of the case (Tubular Steel Framed Stacking Chairs
from Italy, 50 Fed. Reg. 21,919 (1985) (seasonal nature of the product)); 2) the period will
only be expanded to facilitate the calculation of U.S. price, not FMV; and 3) the period
of investigation is only extended back to encompass sales prior to the normal period of
investigation, not forward. Id. at 4.
101. Id. at 7. Because of hyperinflation, the costs Borlem and FNV incurred in producing the
TSDWs and the value received for the TSDWs were changing too rapidly to permit expanding the
period of investigation. The presence of hyperinflation in the Brazilian economy created rapidly
changing production costs for FNV giving it an incentive to dump TSDWs in the U.S. market.
102. Id. at 7-8.
103. Comment on FNV Response, supra note 98, at 7-8.
104. Brazilian inflation was running between 300% and 400% per annum. The Brazilian
government adopted the Cruzado Plan in an effort to halt this hyperinflation. The basic components
of the plan were: (1) the freezing of all prices, wages, and the exchange rate; (2) de-indexing the
economy; (3) the introduction of a new currency, the cruzado, to replace the Cruzeiro, from which
three zeros were removed; (4) converting all term contracts (such as wages, debts, rents, school
tuition, and mortgage payments) from cruzeiro to cruzados via formulas which would guarantee the
recomposition of the average real price of the previous six months. All other stipulations of the
Cruzado Plan complimented or established exceptions to these four fundamental guidelines. Luiz
Bresser Pereira, Inertial Inflation and the Cruzado Plan, 15 WoRLD DEV. 1035,1036 (1987); Eliana
A. Cardoso & Rudiger Dombusch, Brazil's Tropical Plan, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 288 (1987) (one of
four papers presented during conference and published under the general title Stopping High
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Brazilian hyperinflation primarily affected FNV's raw material and
labor costs.1"6 In order to accurately reflect costs, FNV had to
index its financial statements during the period of hyperinflation
before the Cruzado Plan went into effect. 07 Financial statements
in the post-Cruzado Plan period, March 1986 through June 1986,
were not subject to adjustments."' Like Borlem, FNV
endeavored to provide information to Commerce regarding the
replacement costs of production in order to determine market
value."°
As it had with Borlem, Budd Company asserted that FNV was
not properly applying replacement cost accounting in its financial
Inflation). See Wemer Beer, The Resurgence of Inflation in Brazi4 1974-1986, 15 WoRD DEV. 1007
(1987) (providing an examination of factors contributing to the resurgence of inflation, and failure
of orthodox austerity programs to control it); Eul-Soo Pang, The Darker Side of Brazil's Democracy,
7 CUNRmr MIST. 21 (1988) (blaming politics for the ultimate failure of the Cruzado Plan).
105. Response of FNV-Veiculos BEquipamentos S.A. on Costs at 1, in the matter of Tubeless
Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin. (Inv. No. A-351-606) (Sept. 15,1986)
(Confidential Version). The three accounting periods were the annual financial statement for 1985
prepared at calendar year end, a special financial statement covering January and February 1986
required under Brazilian law due to efforts to end hyperinflation, and a semi-annual financial
statement from March through June 1986 (excluding January and February). Id.
106. Id. at 4.
107. Id. at 6. FNV summarized the inflation index as follows:
The official index used as the basis for determining the rate of inflation in Brazil is the.
'Obrigacoew Reajustraveis do Tesouro Naciona" or ORTN. This index serves as the basis
for adjustments to the balance sheet to reflect inflation... ORTN ceased when the
Government adopted the Cruzado Plan in February 1986.
Id.
FNV summarized the adjustments to the financial statements reflecting inflation as follows:
Generally accepted accounting principles in Brazil differ in only one significant respect
from those in the United States. Through February 1986, when the Cruzado Plan was put
into effect Brazilian companies were required to reflect the effects of inflation on their
balance sheet on their statement of income. The effects of inflation are divided into two
broad categories: (1) adjustment of permanent assets and shareholder equity to reflect the
effects of inflation, by using ORTN; and (2) adjustments to the principal value of loans
that are either indexed.., or subject to devaluation ....
Id. at 6-7.
108. Id. at 7.
109. Supplemental Response of FNV-Veiculos E Equipamentos S.A. at 1, in the matter of
Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (Dec.
5, 1986) (Non-Confidential Version). Replacement costs would reflect FNVs costs if during each
month of the investigatory period FNV had purchased raw materials, produced a TSDW, and shipped
the finished product within a given month. Id.
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reports to Commerce.110  Budd Company believed the
methodology employed by both Borlem and FNV resulted in
erroneous conclusions of fact.'11 Therefore, Budd Company
requested that Commerce make a preliminary finding that Borlem
and FNV were dumping TSDWs on the U.S. market.
Commerce's preliminary investigation led to the conclusion that
TSDWs were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United States
for less than fair value.' In determining that Borlem and FNV
were dumping, Commerce based its findings on the constructed
foreign market value of the TSDWs produced by Borlem and
FNV."' This was the methodology propounded by Budd
Company in its comments on the information provided by Borlem
and FNV to Commerce.1
4
Commerce used a constructed foreign market value for Borlem
because sales in the home market were found to be made at prices
which would not allow Borlem to recoup its costs within a
reasonable period of time.115 Because FNV made no Brazilian or
third country sales during the investigatory period, Commerce used
the constructed foreign market value in determining whether FNV
was dumping TSDWs into the United States. 6 In constructing
110. Comment on Joint Response on Costs, supra note 91, at 1. The Budd Company stated
that:
Both FNV and Borlem start from the proposition that replacement cost accounting
contemplates that raw material is purchased, an article produced, and shipment to the
customer all occur within a single month. Petitioner disagrees with this assessment of
replacement cost accounting as well as with most of the adjustments to cost claimed by
respondents.
Petitioner understands the concept of replacement cost accounting to describe a
system whereby the purchased elements of the cost of production are adjusted to equalize
the effects of inflation on such items. Id.
111. Id.
112. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 49,604. Commerce's Preliminary
Determination instructed the U.S. Custom Service to: -... suspend the liquidation of all entries of
certain tubeless steel disc wheels... and to require a cash deposit or bond for each entry in an
amount equal to the estimated dumping margin .... -IM
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
115. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 49,604. See supra notes 88-90
and accompanying text. This conclusion is consistent with the position taken by Budd Company.
116. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 49,604. See supra notes 96-103
and accompanying text (Commerce failed to include the Canadian sales).
209
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 5
the foreign market value, Commerce made adjustments to the
financial information submitted by Borlem and FNV.7
Initially, the two most important adjustments came in the areas
of financial expenses and monetary corrections." 8 The monetary
corrections made by Borlem and FNV in their January-February
financial statements to compensate for the effects of hyperinflation
in Brazil were not included in Commerce's constructed foreign
market values."9
During the preliminary investigation, Commerce considered the
sales date to be the date the TSDWs were shipped to the United
States. 2 Therefore, Commerce compared the foreign market
value on the shipment date with the U.S. price on the shipment
date."2 Commerce accomplished this comparison by converting
Brazilian currency into U.S. dollars at the exchange rate prevailing
on the date the TSDWs were shipped to the United States.
22
Commerce's preliminary investigation showed Borlem and FNV
had dumping margins of 24.85% and 5.75% respectively. 123 The
administrative record, along with Commerce's findings, was made
available to the ITC for review in the ITC's material injury
investigation. 124 Commerce stated that its final determination on
the dumping allegations against Borlem and FNV would be
published in March 1987.1'
117. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 49,605.
118. Id.
119. Id. Commerce stated that-
Since replacement costs were used for the cost of production and detailed data needed to
adjust the monetary correction to account for the effects of the use of replacement costs
was not available, the Department did not include the monetary corrections. Id.
120. Borlem S.A. Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1623 (1988)
(Slip Op. 88-77). However, upon further investigation Commerce determined that currency conversion
should occur at the time of sale. This decision led to an appeal to the C1T by Borlem and FNV. See
infra notes 242-273 and accompanying text.
121. 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1623 (1988).
122. Commerce Preliminary Determination, supra note 61, at 49,905 (in accordance with 19
C.F.R. § 353.56(a), the exchange rate certified by the Federal Reserve Bank).
123. Id. at 46,906.
124. Id. The ITC makes an injury determination within 120 days after Commerce's preliminary
determination, or 45 days after Commerce's final determination. The ITC reports its preliminary
findings on material injury before Commerce produces a Final Determination.
125. Id. at 46,904.
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2. Commerce's Final Determination
On February 17, 1987, Commerce held a public hearing prior
to issuing its Final Determination on whether TSDWs were being
dumped into the United States." 6 In its prehearing brief, Budd
Company argued that Commerce's use of replacement cost
accounted for inflation in the production operations but not in the
financial operations of Borlem and FNV. 7 Therefore, Budd
Company felt that a monetary correction to the balance sheets of
Borlem and FNV was necessary to accurately analyze the impact
of inflation on the two companies." 8 Furthermore, Budd
Company felt that the manner in which Commerce included short
term financial expenses failed to properly account for inflation.'29
In conclusion, Budd Company requested that Commerce make
adjustments to Borlem's and FNV's financial statements in order
to accurately capture every element of Borlem's and FNV's costs
of production. 3 '
Borlem and FNV submitted a combined final prehearing brief
for Commerce's consideration.' Borlem and FNV argued that
the most important issue in the investigation was Commerce's
126. Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels From
Brazil, 52 Fed. Reg. 8947, 8948 (1987) (Inv. No. A-351-606) [hereinafter Commerce Final
Determination].
127. Id.
128. Prehearing Brief of Petitioner, The Budd Company Wheel and Brake Division at 4-7, in
the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-351-
606 (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Preheating Brief of Budd Company].
129. Id. at 7.
130. Id. Specifically, Budd Company submitted that Commerce should:
1) include in cost of production an amount for monetary correction to account for the
effects of inflation on those elements not addressed in industrial costs; 2) adjust all cost
factors, including short-term expense, to account for the effects of inflation; 3) include in
cost of production an amount for semi-finished and finished product inventory; 4) adopt
respondents' actual, rather than hypothetical, material costs; 5) employ actual, rather than
.'normalized", costs; 6) calculate costs of production and constructed value on a monthly
basis; 7) carefully examine the books and records of respondents to determine whether,
and to what extent, SO&A expenses are understated by the inclusion of interest income
and exchange rate gains unrelated to the production or sale of tubeless steel disc wheels;
and 8) issue an affirmative final determination of sales at less than fair value. Id. at 20-21.
131. Prehearing Brief on Behalf ofBorlem S.A. Empreedimentos Industriais and FNV-Veiculos
E Equipamentos, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade
Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (Feb. 12, 1987) [hereinafter Prehearing Brief of Respondents].
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treatment of financial expenses and monetary costs under the
replacement cost basis of accounting.13 2 Borlem and FNV
believed that when replacement costs were used, Commerce had to
make several adjustments to financial costs in order to reach an
accurate result.133 Borlem and FNV were concerned that the
methodology employed by Commerce in constructing the foreign
market value overstated the costs of production."3' Specifically,
Borlem and FNV requested that Commerce alter its methodology
of computing financial costs by: (1) eliminating monetary
correction as a cost of production; (2) eliminating monetary
correction of loan values, and substituting instead the use of real
interest costs; and (3) using real gains in inventory value on the
income statement.1 35  Additionally, in its final investigation,
Commerce changed the date in calculating foreign market value for
comparison with U.S. prices to the sales date rather than the
shipment date. 36 Borlem and FNV argued that Commerce should
convert the constructed values as of the date of the shipment of the
132. Id. at 1.
133. Id. at 1. As Borlem and FNV explained:
Brazilian accounting principles prior to February 28,1986 required that the profit and loss
statements carry over from the balance sheet as an expense item so-called monetary
correction of the balance sheet and monetary correction/devaluation of the principal
amount of loans subject to correction or devaluation... Use of monetary correction as
an expense item reduces profits (or increases losses) to reflect the extent to which the
profit on operations measured at historical cost do not cover the maintenance of working
capital in real terms.... Since Brazilian accounting forbids use of "replacement" or
LIFO cost and instead applies monetary correction of the balance sheet (with inventory
valued at historical cost) and of loan principal, use of "replacement" costs requires
significant adjustments to the accounting principles used by respondents in their normal
financial statements. Id. at 3-4.
134. Id. Any calculations increasing Borlem and FNV's costs of production would make it
more likely that they were selling TSDWs for less than the cost of production and thus dumping
TSDWs into the U.S. market.
135. Id. at 7-8.
136. Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126, at 8950. As Commerce stated:
At the time of our preliminary determination, a pattern of long time periods between reported
dates of sale and shipment indicated the likelihood that date of shipment reflected the actual
date of sale. However, verification has established that all elements necessary to constitute a
sale were present at the sale dates reported. Therefore, for our final determination we have
converted foreign market values to U.S. dollars at the rates in effect on the verified dates of
sale, in accordance with § 353.56(a) of our regulations. Id.
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TSDWs, rather than the date of sale.' 37 Borlem and FNV felt that
these adjustments were necessary in order to accurately calculate
their foreign market values under U.S. antidumping laws.
138
Conversely, Budd Company felt that Commerce's methodology was
understating Borlem's and FNV's costs of production.
Borlem and FNV believed that in constructing the foreign
market value, cruzeiros should have been converted into dollars as
of the date of shipment rather than the date of sale. 39 Because of
Brazil's hyperinflation, Borlem and FNV felt that the dumping
analysis would yield a significantly lower foreign market value if
cruzeiros were converted into dollars on the later shipment date
rather than the earlier sales. 4 Commerce acknowledged that a
"pattern of long time periods" existed between the date of sale
and the shipment date.' 4' However, Commerce felt all the
elements constituting a sale were present on the sale dates.
42
Therefore, Commerce decided to calculate the foreign market value
on the sales date rather than the shipment date.143  Despite
Commerce's decision, Borlem and FNV continued to claim that
Commerce was mistaken in converting Brazilian currency into
dollars on the date of sale rather than the shipment date.'"
137. Prehearing Brief of Respondents, supra note 131, at 29. See Commerce Final
Determination, supra note 126, at 8950 (conversion at Federal Reserve rates in effect) Commerce
originally used the date of shipment as the date to convert currency. See also infra notes 231-37 and
accompanying text.
138. Prehearing Brief of Respondents, supra note 131, at 30. In their conclusion, Borlem and
FNV asked Commerce to:
(1) eliminate monetary correction of the balance sheet and of loan principal values as
costs of production; (2) adjust the costs of production to reflect the unrealized inventory
gains; (3) adjust raw material costs to reflect the benefit of financing at below market
rates; (4) adjust selling and administrative expenses and financial expenses to reflect the
use of replacement costs as the basis for the cost of production; (5) use "'real' short term
financing costs; (6) not use an imputed credit cost in calculating cost of production; and
(7) correct errors in the comparison between price and constructed value in the
preliminary determination. Id. at 29-30.
139. Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126, at 8950.
140. See generally, DYNAMucs OF HYPERwI.ATION, supra note 86, at 25-117 (this is due to
the decreased value of currency in hyperinflationary economies).
141. Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126, at 8950.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
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After the February 17, 1987 public hearing, but prior to
Commerce's publishing its Final Determination, Borlem and FNV
wrote a letter to Commerce explaining how Commerce
miscalculated the dumping margins.145  Borlem and FNV
requested that Commerce correct its method for determining the
foreign market value before the ITC's final hearing on material
injury scheduled for March 24, 1987. Borlem and FNV contended
that Commerce's methodology resulted in inaccuracies in the cost
price and constructed value comparisons, and that use of
replacement costs on the shipment date resulted in reported costs
being 25% higher than reported under the Brazilian historical cost
method of accounting. 146 In calculating the constructed foreign
market value for TSDWs, Commerce deviated from its customary
practice of comparing prices and costs within the same time
frame."4 Finally, Borlem and FNV felt that if Commerce
continued to compare prices and costs from different months, a
145. Letter on Behalf of Borlem and FNV to the Secretary of Commerce, in the matter of
Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the Int'l Trade Admin., Inv. No. A-351-606 (Mar.
18, 1987).
146. Id. at 2. The Letter stated that:
In the investigation, Commerce rejected use of historical costs which represented the
actual cost of producing the merchandise under investigation and used instead
"replacement" cost at the time of shipment. ...
The cost used both for the cost-price and constructed value-price comparisons was
not, therefore, actual cost either on the date of sale or date of export. Instead, the cost
used was replacement cost reflecting both the effects of inflation between sale and
shipment and the inflated cost of replacing the product shipped rather than the actual
historical cost of that product.... Thus, Commerce's methodology used costs which were
25 percent above the costs reported according to generally accepted accounting principles
in Brazil.... Thus, for example, the sale price in December (date of sale) was compared
with the replacement cost in February (date of export).
This extraordinary methodology increased cruzeiro costs by approximately 40
percent (i.e. the difference between historical costs and replacement costs) in recognition
of the hyperinflation in Brazil. Commerce ignored, however, the effects of hyperinflation
and parallel devaluation of the cruzeiro on the conversion of cruzeiro costs to dollars.
Thisfailure created a dumping margin that bears no relationship to the revenues received
from an export and the cost of producing that export id
147. Id. at 3-4. It was argued that Commerce varied from its own guidelines established in
OCrG from Argentina, 50 Fed. Reg. 12,595 (March 29, 1985) ("Current costs represent those
required to produce product in month of sale .... "). Additionally, section 773(e) of the Tariff Act
of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) states that the constructed value of costs must be set at
the time preceding exportation of the product. Id.
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circumstance of sale adjustment was warranted. 48 Eventually, the
issue of when to convert Brazilian currency into dollars was the
subject of an appeal to the CIT.14 9 However, the dispute over
when to convert Brazilian currency into dollars did not prevent
Commerce from issuing its Final Determination.
On March 20, 1987 Commerce issued its Final Determination
that Borlem and FNV were dumping TSDWs into the United
States. 150  Commerce concluded that Borlem and FNV had
dumping margins of 15.25% and 19.93% respectively.15'
Commerce notified the ITC of its Final Determination that Borlem
and FNV were dumping TSDWs into the United States. 152 After
Commerce issued its Final Determination, the ITC was required to
reach a final ruling on whether there was a threat of material injury
to the U.S. TSDW industry. An aff'rmative finding by the ITC
would result in Commerce issuing a final dumping duty order to
the U.S. Customs Service.
In practice, Commerce first publishes its preliminary
determination. Then, if Commerce finds dumping, the ITC conducts
an investigation and reaches its preliminary findings. Next, if the
ITC finds injury, Commerce conducts further review leading to the
final determination. If Commerce's final determination is that
148. Id. at 5. Borlem and FNV asserted that:
An adjustment for the difference in this circumstance of sale - i.e. the devaluation effect
on the U.S. sale and the absence of such an effect on the domestic [Brazilian] side - must
be made to reflect the appreciated value of the U.S. sale in cruzeiros between the date of
sale and date of shipment...
Failure by Commerce to correct their error will have the following absurd result. A
sale in December shipped in February would have an enormous margin, whereas a sale
at the identical dollar price made and shipped in January would have no margin.... the
cost and price of both sales would be identical ... but one would have a margin equal
to the rate of devaluation [of the cruzeiros] between December and February while the
other would have no margin. Id.
149. See infra notes 242-73 and accompanying text.
150. Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126.
151. Id. at 8951 (preliminary investigation found the dumping margins to be Borlem 24.85%
and FIV 5.57%).
152. Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126, at 8951.
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dumping is occurring, then the ITC has hearings leading to final
findings regarding injury.153
B. The ITC's Investigation of Borlem and FNV
After Budd Company filed its petition initiating this
investigation, the ITC held a conference where Budd Company,
Borlem, and FNV presented evidence for the ITC's consideration
in its preliminary investigation.154 At issue was whether imports
of TSDWs caused material injury, threatened material injury to, or
retardation of, the U.S. TSDW industry.'55 After the hearing,
Budd Company filed a post conference brief recapping its
arguments for the ITC. 15 6 Borlem and FNV filed a joint post
conference brief in opposition to the allegations made by Budd
Company. 157
1. The ITC's Preliminary Investigation
As with Commerce's investigation, Budd Company was acting
on behalf of the other U.S. TSDW manufacturers before the
ITC.'58 Budd Company claimed that the domestic TSDW industry
had suffered declining production, shipments, employment, capacity
utilization, and market share, while imports of Brazilian TSDWs
increased. 159 According to Budd Company, the losses suffered by
153. For purposes of this article, Commerce's preliminary and final determinations have been
placed in one section and all of the ITC's preliminary and final findings placed in a separate section.
154. Post-Conference Brief of The Budd Company Wheel & Brake Division, in the matter of
Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the U.S.I.T.C, Inv. No. 731-TA-335 (June 18,1986)
(preliminary) [hereinafter Post-Conference Brief of Budd Company].
155. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (explanation of ITC's role in determining
injury to domestic industry).
156. Post-Conference Brief of Budd Company, supra note 154.
157. Respondents' Brief in Opposition to the Petition, in the matter of Tubeless Steel Disc
Wheels from Brazil Before the U.SJ.T.C., Inv. No. 731-TA-335 (June 18, 1986) (Non-Confidential
Version) (Preliminary) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief in Opposition].
158. See Post-Conference Brief of Budd Company, supra note 154; see also, Petition, supra
note 61.
159. Post-Conference Brief of Budd Company, supra note 154, at 2. Imports of Brazilian
TSDW increased in both absolute and relative terms in relation to domestic production and
consumption.
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U.S. manufacturers were the direct result of systematic
underpricing by Borlem and FNV. ° According to Budd
Company, the production and sales practices of Borlem and FNV
constituted a continuing threat to U.S. TSDW manufacturers.
Specifically, Budd Company gave four reasons why Brazilian
TSDWs constituted a clear and imminent threat of material injury
to U.S. manufacturers.161 First, Brazilian production capacity for
TSDWs was increasing. 2 Second, Budd Company cited the rise
in Brazilian imports-from a negligible level in 1984 to
approximately 125,000 units in 1985-as indicative of future trends
in the TSDW industry. 163 Third, Budd Company pointed to
evidence that Brazilian TSDWs entering the United States
suppressed the market price.16 Finally, the fact that there was an
under utilization of production capacity in Brazil led Budd
Company to believe that Borlem and FNV would continue to dump
TSDWs into the U.S. market, thereby harming U.S.
manufacturers. 16 Therefore, Budd Company requested that the
ITC determine that Brazilian TSDWs imported into the U.S. had
materially injured, and threatened to materially injure, the U.S.
TSDW industry. 166 Naturally, Borlem and FNV believed that
imports of TSDWs from Brazil did not constitute an imminent
threat of material injury to the U.S. TSDW industry.
160. Id. Budd Company countered claims by Borlem and FNV that TSDWs imported from
Japan were the cause of the decline in TSDW prices. TSDWs from Japan were available in limited
supply in the United States. Additionally, a recall and repair of Japanese manufactured TSDWs
resulted in them being sold at a deep discount Id. at 7-8.
161. Id. at 10 (imminent threat of material injury is defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(0).
162. Id. at 10. Borlem and Fumagalli, another Brazilian firm not involved in the investigation,
were expanding production capacity. Additionally, Budd Company alleged that both Borlem and FNV
could swiftly and cheaply convert tubed steel disc wheel production facilities into TSDW facilities.
By contrast, U.S. TSDW manufacturers could not convert tubed steel disc wheel production to TSDW
production without considerable expense in time and money. Id. at 2-3.
163. Id. at 10.
164. Post-Conference Brief of Budd Company, supra note 154, at 10. Budd also argued that
the rapid increase in Brazilian production capacity coupled with Brazil's need to obtain dollars in
international trade made it likely that Borlem and FNV would continue to dump TSDWs in the
United States. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 11-12.
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Borlem and FNV felt Budd Company's petition was motivated
by fear that increased Brazilian manufacturing capacity would
cause increasing competition in the OEM market for TSDWs. 167
Although Brazilian capacity was expanding, Borlem and FNV
asserted that the increased production of TSDWs was not targeted
for the U.S. market. 168 Actually, Borlem and FNV estimated that
imports of Brazilian TSDWs into the U.S. market for 1986 would
actually decline from 1985 levels.169 Borlem and FNV asserted
that other foreign producers of TSDWs were responsible for the
injury, if any, suffered by U.S. manufacturers. 7
Borlem and FNV cited evidence that from the first time
TSDWs from Brazil were imported into the United States until the
last quarter of 1985, no U.S. manufacturer lowered its price."7 '
According to the Brazilian companies, it was a Japanese TSDW
importer, Minebea/NMB who first cut prices, forcing U.S.
manufacturers to follow suit. 72 Borlem and FNV noted that the
price reduction by Minebea/NMB coincided with the only price
167. Respondents' Brief in Opposition, supra note 157, at 2. According to respondents, there
were three customers of Brazilian produced TSDWs. Two customers made single purchases of an
insubstantial quantities. The third customer purchased small quantities of Brazilian TSDWs as
protection against disruption of U.S. produced TSDWs as had occurred in 1984 and 1985. Id.
168. Id. at 3. Borlem and FNV claimed that they were both operating above full capacity to
meet Brazilian domestic and non-U.S. export demand and that increased production capacity was
required to meet that demand. Id.
169. Id. at 4. Through May 1986 the volume of imports of Brazilian TSDWs into the United
States indicated that the yearly total of Brazilian TSDWs would be 33% below 1985 levels, or less
than half of the 175,000 units projected by Budd Company.
Budd Company noted the overall demand in the TSDW market declined approximately 20%
through May 1985. Borlem and FNV argued that if Brazilian TSDWs were the low cost alternative,
Brazilian market share would have increased or held steady rather than decline by a greater amount
than the overall market. Id. at 4, 10.
170. Id. at 4-6. When Brazilian TSDWs were first introduced into the U.S. market they were
sold at lower prices than U.S. TSDWs, Borlem and FNV advanced two reasons why this did not
adversely affect U.S. manufacturers: (1) the price difference was partly attributable to the necessity
to compensate the buyer for the eight to ten weeks delay in receiving an order of Brazilian TSDWs;
and (2) as newcomers to the U.S. market Borlem and FNV lacked an established record for quality
and reliability and a price discount was necessary to compensate buyers for the added risk of
purchasing from untested suppliers. l
171. Id. at 4. Borlem and FNV stated that two U.S. manufacturers actually increased prices.
Additionally, Firestone and Motor Wheel were importing TSDWs from Germany at CIF prices nearly
identical to that charged by Borlem and FNV. Id.
172. Respondents' Brief in Opposition, supra note 157, at 4. In late 1985, Minebca/NMB
lowered the price of 24.5-inch and 22.5-inch TSDWs sold at $42 and $40 respectively. Id.
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decrease recorded in 1984-1985 by U.S. manufacturers. 173
Additionally, imports of Brazilian TSDWs began declining during
this period of lowering prices.174 Borlem and FNV argued to the
ITC that Budd Company's petition ignored the fact the
Minebea/NMB caused the TSDW price reduction of 1985, and that
the price decrease corresponded with the reduction of Brazilian
TSDW imports.1 "5 Borlem and FNV requested that the ITC find
that Brazilian TSDWs had not materially injured or threatened
material injury to U.S. TSDW manufacturers.176 After a review
of all the evidence presented, the 1TC issued its preliminary
findings.
The ITC issued its preliminary findings in July 1986. 77 The
ITC's investigation revealed that the TSDW industry in the United
States experienced a sharp increase in demand from 1.20 million
units in 1983 to 2.25 million in 1984.17 Because of the
extraordinary surge in demand in 1984, U.S. industrial output of
TSDWs reached 107.2% of capacity. 179 Domestic producers of
TSDWs sought overseas suppliers in an effort to meet U.S.
demand. 8 ' Borlem and FNV began producing TSDWs for export
to the U.S. market near the end of 1984.8' Unfortunately for
U.S. manufacturers, the TSDWs from Brazil gained a strong share
of the U.S. market.
While demand for TSDWs remained strong, sales figures for
1985 and 1986 indicated a moderate decline in TSDW
consumption. 82 Although there was only a moderate decline in
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5-6 (Budd also ignored imports of German TSDWs).
176. Id. at 17-19.
177. 1TC Preliminary Investigation, supra note 60.
178. Id. This 87.5% increase was attributed to the enactment of new governmental regulations
and the strong economic recovery releasing "pent-up" demand. Consumers had postponed purchases
of SDWs in anticipation of the new regulations. Id.
179. Id. The figure for U.S. industrial utilization was amended from 107.2% to 106.1% in the
final report. Final Investigative Report, Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil, 731-TA-335 US1TC
Pub. 1971, (Apr. 1987) (final) [hereinafter ITC Final Investigation].
180. ITC Preliminary Investigation, supra note 60.
181. Id.
182. Id. The Final Investigation placed the decline in demand at 9.2% and 4.3% for 1985 and
1986 respectively. ITC Final Investigation, supra note 179.
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demand, U.S. manufacturers experienced a dramatic decline in
market share.183 U.S. plants manufacturing TSDWs experienced
a drop in plant utilization."8 4 Not surprisingly, there was a
corresponding reduction in income for U.S. manufacturers.185
Meanwhile, Brazil's capacity to produce TSDWs tripled
between 1984 and 1986.186 Brazilian production capacity
increased at the same time utilization of existing capacity in U.S.
manufacturing plants decreased. Borlem and FNV became fierce
competitors in the U.S. market. The ITC noted that the
performance of U.S. manufacturers of TSDWs had "shown
consistent declines in almost all major indicators even though the
market for TSDWs [remained] quite strong." ' 7 Therefore, the
ITC determined that the evidence provided a reasonable indication
that the U.S. TSDW industry was materially injured. 88
2. The ITC's Final Investigation
After receiving notification that Commerce had made a final
determination that Brazilian TSDWs were sold in the United States
at less than fair value, the ITC continued its investigation. 89 On
March 24, 1987, the ITC held a hearing giving all interested parties
an opportunity to present information to the ITC before it issued its
final investigative report." Budd Company submitted a
prehearing brief on behalf of U.S. manufacturers.191 Borlem and
183. Id. From 84.2% market share in 1983 to 50.8% in 1984. A comparison of January through
March 1985 to January through March of 1986 showed a drop from 79.2% to 48.9%. Id.
184. 1TC Final Investigation, supra note 179. Capacity dropped to 85.8% and 66.1% in 1985
and 1986 respectively. Id.
185. ITC Preliminary Investigation, supra note 60. (net income for the industry dropped from
$3.5 million in 1984 to $3.1 million in 1985 and net losses in the industry for 1986 totalled $992,000




189. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text (discussion of Commerce's Final
Determination).
190. ITC Final Investigation, supra note 179.
191. Prehearing Brief of Petitioner, The Budd Company Wheel and Brake Division, in the
matter of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the U.S.I.T.C., Inv. No. 731-TA-335 (Mar.
19, 1987) (final) [hereinafter ITC Prehearing Brief of Budd Company].
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FNV submitted a joint prehearing brief to the ITC detailing their
position.I9
In its brief, Budd Company reiterated its claim that imports of
Brazilian TSDWs were increasing relative to U.S. production, and
that the U.S. TSDW market was suppressed due to sales of
Brazilian TSDWs at below market prices.1 93 Budd Company
alleged that the selling practices of Borlem and FNV negatively
affected U.S. manufacturers as shown by declining performance in
production, shipments, capacity utilization, and market share.1 94
Budd Company claimed that under the criteria established by 19
U.S.C. § 1677(7)(b), the ITC was required to find that Brazilian
TSDWs had caused material injury to the U.S. TSDW industry. 95
Additionally, Budd Company contended that further imports of
Brazilian TSDWs constituted an imminent threat of material injury
to U.S. manufacturers.
1 6
Budd Company argued that under all the relevant criteria, the
threat of actual injury to the U.S. TSDW industry was
192. Respondents' Prehearing Brief in Opposition to the Petition, in the matter of Tubeless
Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil Before the U.S.I.T.C., Inv. No. 731-TA-335 (Mar. 19, 1987) (Non-
Confidential Version) (final) [hereinafter ITC Respondents' Preheauing Brief].
193. ITC Prehearing Brief of Budd Company, supra note 191, at 2. Budd Company asserted
that:
During the period of review in this investigation competitive imports from other
sources, Germany and Japan, have either ceased altogether or been substantially curtailed.
... During 1985 and 1986 as other imports retreated from the market and overall demand
declined, low priced Brazilian T/LSDW imports captured an increasing market share. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) states:
In making its determinations... the Commission, in each case-
(i) shall consider-
(1) the volume of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the
investigation,
(I) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for like
products, and
(IM) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of like
products, but only in the context of production operations within the United
States; and
(i) may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination
regarding whether there is material injury by reason of imports.
§ 1677(7)(B).
196. Id. at 29-36.
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imminent.197 First, Brazilian production capacity was expanding,
and the only market sufficiently large enough to absorb the
additional capacity was the United States.198 As Brazilian
production capacity increased, there would be a continuing threat
that increased imports of Brazilian TSDWs would further depress
the U.S. market.199 In addition, the domestic situation in Brazil
indicated that Borlem and FNV would continue exporting TSDWs
to the United States.
The Cruzado Plan,2 0  designed to eliminate Brazil's
hyperinflation had recently failed, and hyperinflation had returned
to the Brazilian economy.21 The failure of the Cruzado Plan was
expected to curb economic growth in Brazil, thereby reducing
Brazilian demand for both tube-type or tubeless-type wheels.
212
Coupled with the return of hyperinflation to Brazil, the Brazilian
government had just announced a moratorium on its foreign debt
payments.23 The suspension of debt payments made it necessary
for Brazil to maintain a trade surplus so that it could obtain the
western currency it needed to resume debt payments.* 4
197. Id. at 29.
198. ITC Prehearing Brief of Budd Company, supra note 191, at 29-30. Budd Company set
out to counter the assertion by Borlem and FNV that the increased production was headed for
markets other than the United States, and that Brazilian demand required them to shift production
from tubeless to tube-type wheels:
Respondents' have suggested that market opportunities exist for them in third countries
such as South Africa and Australia. Based on petitioner's calculations of total truck and
trailer demand, the maximum demand for tubeless steel disc wheels in such markets, in
the unlikely event that every truck built ran on tubeless Brazilian wheels, would be
170,000 per year. Because tube-type wheels are preferred in most of the world outside
Europe and North America, and because Europe possesses substantial captive capacity for
the production of tubeless steel disc wheels, the additional capacity being added in Brazil
can have no outlet other than the United States. In addition, Borlem, one of the two
producers covered by the investigation, is owned, in part, by Lemmerz, a West German
wheel producer who is unlikely to permit Borlem's new capacity to be directed towards
its European market. Id. at 30.
199. Id. at 33.
200. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
201. ITC Prehearing Brief of Budd Company, supra note 191, at 35.
202. Id. at 31 (No expectation of short-term increase in demand).
203. Id. at 35 (announced Feb. 20, 1987).
204. Id. As Budd Company argued, "Given the return of hyperinflation to Brazil and the need
for it to obtain foreign capital in order to resume payments on its debt, Brazil has no option other
than to increase exports to its principal debtors [ic], including, most important, the United States."
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Therefore, every incentive existed for Borlem and FNV to continue
increasing their exports to the United States regardless of the
impact on U.S. prices or U.S. manufacturers."' Budd believed
that the evidence clearly showed that due to increased capacity, and
the situation in the Brazilian economy, Borlem and FNV
constituted an imminent threat of material injury to the U.S. TSDW
market." 6 Conversely, in their brief filed with the ITC, Borlem
and FNV attempted to show the ITC that they did not pose an
imminent threat of material injury to U.S. TSDW manufacturers.
The brief filed by Borlem and FNV attacked the accuracy of
Budd Company's findings that Brazilian sales were increasing,
while the U.S. TSDW market was experiencing reduced
demand." 7 Borlem and FNV stated that the volume of Brazilian
TSDWs exported to the United States was less than one-half the
175,000 units projected by Budd Company.20 8 In fact, Borlem
and FNV found that when U.S. demand for TSDWs declined in
late 1985 through 1986, sales of Brazilian TSDWs into the U.S.
market declined by a greater proportion than other
manufacturers. 2 ' According to Borlem and FNV, price
suppression and injury in the U.S. market, if any,21 0 resulted from
low prices charged by Japanese importers and Firestone, but not
Id.
205. Id.
206. 1TC Preheating Brief of Budd Company, supra note 191, at 37.
207. ITC Respondents' Prehearing Brief, supra note 192, at 3. Borlem and FNV renewed their
arguments that Budd Company's petition was motivated primarily out of fear that Brazilian TSDWs
were going to penetrate the OEM market. Also, they reasserted their claim that none of their
increased production capacity was targeted for the U.S. market. Id.
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 8, 11-15.
210. Borlem and FNV questioned whether the U.S. TSDW industry had suffered any harm at
all. Id. at 20-22. The TSDW industry had slumped from the record high years of 1984 ($4.6 million
in profits) and 1985 ($3.5 million in profits). However, Budd and FNV stated that there was no injury
from Brazilian imports because "[a]lthough the industry showed a profit of only $289,000 in 1986,
U.S. tubeless steel disc wheel production was still more profitable than the general operations of these
[U.S. manufacturers] companies, which incurred a loss from overall operations of $1.9 million in
1986." Id. at 20-21.
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from Brazilian TSDWs.2" Once again, Borlem and FNV
requested that the ITC find that Brazilian TSDWs did not constitute
a material threat to the U.S. TSDW industry.21
The ITC's final investigation resulted in some economic
revisions of its preliminary investigation.2 3 However, these
revisions did not affect the ITC's determination that U.S.
manufacturers suffered significant losses, while Borlem and FNV
continued to undersell domestic producers.214 Therefore, the ITC
in its final investigation found that the U.S. TSDW industry was
threatened with material injury because of the Brazilian
imports.
215
On May 28, 1987, Commerce issued its final antidumping order
to the U.S. Customs Service covering imports of Brazilian TSDWs
into the United States. 2 6 The antidumping order lowered the
dumping margin for FNV from 19.93% to 11.71%.217 Not
surprisingly, the decisions of Commerce and the ITC were appealed
to the CIT.
211. Id. at 18. Borlem and FNV pointed out that-
The present selling price for 24.5-inch Japanese tubeless steel disc wheels is believed to
be between $51.00 and $53.00. At the same time, Japanese wheel producers are
understood to be selling comparable wheels in Canada at between $54.00 and $56.00 per
unit.
Firestone, the largest of the U.S. producers, also appears to be a price leader when
judged on actual transaction rather than list prices. List prices in the industry are for spot
sales only; for contract orders Firestone is believed to be selling 24.5-inch wheels for
$48.00, with payment due forty-five days from pick-up, against a list price of $55.00.
Id. at 19-20.
212. 1TC Respondents' Prehearing Brief, supra note 192, at 24.
213. See supra notes 158-88 and accompanying text.
214. ITC Final Investigation, supra note 179 (no indication that Brazilian pricing practices
would change in foreseeable futute).
215. Id. (19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(4)(B) requires the ITC to make final affirmative determinations
on the basis of threat of material injury).
216. Amendment to Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value; Tubeless Steel Disc
Wheels from Brazil, and Antidumping Order, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,903 (May 28, 1987) [hereinafter Final
Antidumping Order].
217. Id. Apparently, Commerce was still evaluating its methods for determining FNV's
dumping margin. FNV's dumping margin had fluctuated from 5.75% (Commerce Preliminary
Determination, supra note 61, at 46,906) to 19.93% (Commerce Final Determination, supra note 126,
at 8951) to 11.71% (Final Antidumping Order, supra note 216, at 19,903).
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IV. COMMERCE'S DETERMINATIONS: APPEALS TO THE CIT
A. Borlem and FNV Appeal Commerce's Final Determination
Borlem and FNV appealed Commerce's final determination of
dumping to the CIT.218 Pursuant to a directive from the CIT
during oral argument, the parties stipulated to the facts of the
cases.2 19 The parties stipulated that in Commerce's preliminary
determination, it considered the shipment date of Brazilian TSDWs
to the United States as the date of sale.220 Therefore, when
comparing prices between Brazil and the United States, Commerce
compared the foreign market value on the shipment date with the
U.S. price on the shipment date.22' This resulted in Commerce
converting the foreign market value from cruzeiros or cruzados into
U.S. dollars at the exchange rate in effect on the shipment
date.222  However, in Commerce's final determination the
methodology changed, as Commerce compared foreign market
value on the shipment date with U.S. prices on the date of sale.'
Additionally, Commerce's final determination calculated foreign
market value based on the constructed value on the shipment date
to the United States. 224 Foreign market values in cruzeiros or
cruzados were converted into U.S. dollars at the exchange rate in
effect on the sales date rather than the shipment date as had been
the case in the preliminary investigation.' Because of Brazilian
hyperinflation and the devaluation of Brazilian currency, the lapse
218. Borlem S.A. Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 10 I.T.R.D (BNA) 1623 (CIT
June 15, 1988) (Slip Op. 88-77).
219. Id. at 1623.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1623 (1988) (pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 353.53(a)).
223. Id. at 1624. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (Borlem and Budd Company
challenge the change in Commerces methodology prior to issuance of the Final Determination).
224. 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1623 (1988). The court stated that [c]onstructed value was calculated
based upon the replacement costs of merchandise sold to the United States in the month of shipment
to the United States." Id. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. (stating the debate over use
of replacement cost or historical cost accounting).
225. Id. (pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a)).
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of time between the sales date and shipment date resulted in a
lower price for Brazilian TSDWs when converted into U.S. dollars.
The issue on appeal was whether Commerce used the correct
methodology for comparing constructed foreign market value with
the U.S. price in its dumping determination.226 Borlem and FNV
alleged Commerce's conversion of foreign market value into
dollars at an exchange rate other than the one in effect on the date
foreign market value was computed, resulted in Commerce
reaching dumping margin calculations that were not supported by
substantial evidence and not in accordance with law.227
Ultimately, Borlem, FNV, and Commerce requested the court
remand the case to Commerce to recalculate the dumping
margins. 8 However, the Budd Company as defendant-intervenor
opposed the motion for remand.2 The CIT granted the motion
for remand, and ordered Commerce to recalculate the dumping
margins of Borlem and FNV and publish a new determination
within sixty days. ° The court's ruling resulted in another
investigation by Commerce in an attempt to find the' correct
methodology for determining whether Borlem or FNV were
actually dumping TSDWs into the United States.
On remand from the CIT, Commerce reopened its investigation
and subsequently published an Amended Final Detennination.
231
Commerce reiterated that the methodology employed in the
investigation was consistent with Commerce's standard procedure
for determining dumping margins for firms operating in
hyperinflationary economies. 2  By statute and regulation,
226. Id. at 1623-24.
227. Id. at 1624.
228. Id. Commerce disagreed with the reasoning of Borlem and FNV, but nevertheless
supported their motion for remand. Borlem, FNV, and Commerce also agreed to the dismissal of
several counts of the complaint without prejudice. Id.
229. 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1624 (1988).
230. Id.
231. Amended FinalDetermination ofSales at Less than Fair Value and Amended Antidumping
Order, Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil, 53 Fed. Reg. 34,566 (1988) [hereinafter Commerce
Amended Final Determination].
232. Id. As Commerce stated:
Our usual methodology dictates that we calculate a single constructed value for the period
of investigation, but when a country's economy is hyperinflationary,... we calculate
226
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Commerce was required to determine foreign market value at the
shipment date, and convert Brazilian currency into U.S. dollars on
the sales date.233  However, Commerce conceded that a
circumstances of sale adjustment was warranted in this case due to
the lag time between the date TSDWs were sold and the shipment
date.234 Commerce agreed with the prior argument of Borlem and
FNV that calculating price at the sales date, while calculating cost
at the shipment date, resulted in comparing costs at different points
in the chain of distribution. 35  Because of Brazil's
hyperinflationary economy, Commerce determined that a
circumstances of sale adjustment was necessary to eliminate the
distortion in prices and costs resulting from the rapid depreciation
of Brazil's currency. 236 However, Commerce stated that this
adjustment was limited to situations where there was a significant
lag time between the sales date and shipment date.237
After recalculating the dumping margins for Borlem and FNV
utilizing the circumstances of sale adjustment, Commerce reduced
foreign market value on a monthly basis. [citations omitted] Foreign market value
constructed for six different one month periods [December 1985 through May 1986] thus
allows us to account for, in part, the dramatic changes that occur to price and cost
variables because of inflation over the six-month period of investigation.
We also calculate constructed value under our usual methodology by using a
company s historic cost. However, when a country's economy experiences hyperinflation,
we use replacement costs. [emphasis added] [citations omitted] This practice allows the
Department to view costs and prices contemporaneously in order to avoid distortions
caused by hyperinflation and achieve a fairer comparison. Id.
233. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1)(A) (foreign market value constructed upon exportation); 19
C.F.R. § 353.56(a)(1) (currency conversion at exchange rate applicable on sales date).
234. Id. (circumstances of sale adjustment regulations 19 C.F.R. § 353.56).
235. Id. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (The argument by Borlem and FNV
that Commerce's methodology was erroneous).
236. Commerce stated that:
When date of sale occurs in a month preceding the date ofshipment.. application of the
earlier date of sale exchange rate results in a non-contemporaneous comparison [of costs
and price]. In effect, the comparison suffers because all the nominal increases in cost
between date of sale and date of shipment due to hyperinflation are accounted for by the
method in which we constructed foreign market value while the decreased value of the
currency in which those costs are expressed is not.
Commerce Amended Final Determination, supra note 231, at 35,566.
237. Id. Commerce stated, "We consider this [circumstances of sale] adjustment as being
applicable only in cases where foreign market value is based upon monthly constructed values
because of hyperinflation during the investigation and the date of sale occurs in a calendar month
preceding the date of exportation." Id.
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the dumping margin for Borlem to 10.64% and for FNV to
.04%.' 3" FNV's .04% margin was considered de minimis by
Commerce." Therefore, Commerce ordered Customs to suspend
collection of further duties and to issue FNV a refund for any
antidumping duty previously collected.2" For Borlem, Commerce
directed Customs to assess the antidumping duty at the new rate of
10.64%.241 Now it was Budd Company's turn to object to
Commerce's methodology for calculating the dumping margins for
Borlem and FNV.
B. Budd Company Appeals Commerce's Amended Final
Determination
Budd Company was dissatisfied with Commerce's amended
calculations because they resulted in lower dumping margins for
Borlem and FNV. Budd Company, as plaintiff, appealed
Commerce's Amended Final Determination to the CIT.24 2 The
CIT considered appeals of Commerce's Final Determination at the
same time the ITCs findings were being appealed in the CIT and
CAFC.243
First, Budd Company contended that the adjustments to the
constructed foreign market value to offset the devaluation in the
cruzeiro against the U.S. dollar from the sales date to shipment
date was an improper use of the circumstances of sale adjustment
238. Id. at 34,569.
239. 19 C.F.L § 353.24 (margin below .5% considered de minimis).
240. Commerce Amended Final Determination, supra note 231, at 34,569.
241. Id.
242. Budd Company, Wheel & Brake Div. v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1093, 1096-97 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1990). Interestingly, the parties' roles have switched; Budd Company is plaintiff and FNV
is defendant-intervenor.
Initially, Budd Company sought to enjoin Commerce from issuing an order to Customs based
on the Amended Final Determination. The CIT held that Budd Company failed to meet the burden
of proof for issuance of a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the CIT refused to prevent Commerce
from issuing an order consistent with its Amended Final Determination. Budd Company, Wheel and
Brake Div. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 35 (Ct. Intl Trade 1988) (The opinion of October 31, 1988
followed Crs September 28, 1988 order vacating the TRO and denying preliminary injunction)
(FNV participated as defendant-intervenor).
243. See infra note 274 and accompanying text.
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procedure.2 " Furthermore, Commerce's reliance on the
circumstances of sale adjustment to nullify the effects of
hyperinflation in Brazil altered the rules for currency
conversion.245
Therefore, Commerce's actions were not in accordance with
law.2 "6 The CIT found Commerce had broad discretion in
implementing the circumstances of sale adjustments.247  The
purpose of adjusting the foreign market values and U.S. prices was
to measure the value of merchandise at a common point in the
distribution chain.248 Accordingly, to the extent the circumstances
of sale adjustment conflicted with currency conversion regulations,
Commerce's decision was warranted.249  The court felt
Commerce's overriding duty was to provide fair comparisons."
Second, Budd Company asserted that absent amending the
statute, Commerce could not unilaterally alter the method for
applying a circumstances of sale adjustment without violating
procedural due process." The CIT found that Commerce had the
necessary discretion under U.S. antidumping statutes to apply the
circumstances of sales adjustment in this case. 2"  The court stated
that Commerce was merely attempting to use the most accurate
244. 746 F. Supp. at 1097. Defendant FNV contended that Commerce's adjustments to reflect
the effects of hyperinflation between the sales date and shipment date were in accordance with 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) and 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 because the adjustment sought to compare prices
and costs at a common point in the distribution chain. Id. at 1097.
245. Id.; 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(a) (rules for currency conversion).
246. Id. Defendant FNV argued that since the adjustment to constructed foreign market value
properly compensated for the effects of hyperinflation in this case, Commerce's decision was based
on substantial evidence and was therefore in accordance with the law. Id. at 1097.
247. Id. at 1098.19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4) provides for allowances to be made to the satisfaction
of the Secretary of Commerce.
248. Id. at 1099 (quoting Washington Red Raspberry Commn v. United States, 859 F.2d 898,
904 n.36 (1988)).
249. 746 F. Supp. at 1100 (Primary statutory purpose of fairness outweighed limitations of
currency regulations).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1097 (Plaintiff contends this violates the Administrative Procedure Act). Defendant
FNV argued that since Commerce fully explained its methodology in the Final Amended
Determination and that the adjustment complied with existing statutes and regulations, Commerce
was not engaged in improper rule making. Id.
252. Id. at 1100.
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methodology in calculating foreign market value. 3 Specifically,
Commerce was attempting to resolve a conflict in the statutory and
regulatory scheme which caused a comparison of price and costs
at noncontemporaneous points in the distribution process." 4 The
CIT noted that the CAFC had emphasized that fairness was the
fundamental goal of Commerce in administering the antidumping
laws.255 The CIT found that Budd Company was not deprived of
procedural due process, because Commerce fully explained its
reasoning in the Amended Final Determination.25 6
Finally, Budd Company contended hyperinflation is a general
economic condition not "directly related" to the circumstances of
sale. 57 Therefore, if adjustment for hyperinflation was required,
it was improper for Commerce to use the circumstances of sales
adjustment." Commerce conceded that circumstances of sales
adjustments usually involve differences directly related to the sale
of the specific goods under investigation, rather than adjusting for
broader economic factors within the foreign economy.25'
However, Commerce argued that, under the circumstances, Brazil's
hyperinflation made the adjustments directly related to the sale of
TSDWs.26 The CIT held that Commerce violated no statutory
provisions, regulations, or legislative intent underlying the
antidumping laws in this case.261 The CIT concluded that
Commerce's decision to use a circumstances of sale adjustment
253. Id. (Commerce attempting to resolve conflict between date of sale and date of shipment
calculations of foreign market value).
254. 746 F. Supp. at 1100 (adjust for currency calculation as of sales date and constructed
foreign market value as of shipment date).
255. Id. at 1099.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1100. The "directly related- language comes from Commerce regulation 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.15 implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4).
258. Id.
259. 746 F. Supp. at 1101 (circumstances of sale are used to account for different selling
practices in the home and U.S. markets).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1103. The court quoted from the legislative history: -[Circumstances of Sale
Adjustments] should be permitted if they are reasonably identifiable, quantifiable, and directly related
to the sales under consideration and if there is clear and reasonable evidence of their existence and
amount." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 381).
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was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the
law, and upheld Commerce's Amended Final Determination.
262
Although Budd Company lost its appeal to the CIT on the issue of
the propriety of Commerce's circumstances of sale adjustment, it
continued to press the court to overturn the Amended Final
Determination. Therefore, Budd Company initiated a second appeal
to the CIT seeking to reverse Commerce's Amended Final
Determination on other grounds. While the second appeal was
pending, there was no reason for the ITC to reconsider its findings
of material injury to the U.S. TSDW industry because Commerce's
finding that FNV's dumping margins were de minimis might be
overturned.263
Budd Company filed a second appeal to the CIT on the grounds
that the administrative record failed to show that Commerce
properly accounted for the inflation in calculating the constructed
foreign values.264 Budd Company asserted that the record did not
show that Commerce properly accounted for some costs, and that
other costs were excluded altogether.261 Having failed to overturn
the Amended Final Determination on the circumstances of sales
issue, Budd Company sought to attack the underlying factual
assumptions forming the basis of the Amended Final
Determination.2' Budd Company requested that the CIT remand
the case to Commerce so that it could modify its methodology to
262. Id. (Because FNV's dumping margin of.04% was considered de minimis, no antidumping
duty would be assessed against FNV).
263. See infra note 322 and accompanying text. The filing of the second appeal resulted in a
stay of the CAFC's remand to the ITC to reconsider the threat of material injury determination
pending the outcome of the second appeal of Commerce's Amended Final Determination.
264. Budd Company, Wheel & Brake Div. v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 1549, 1551 (CL Int'l
Trade 1991) (FNV defendant-intervenor).
265. Id. at 1551-52. The costs not properly accounted for included general and administrative
expenses, selling and packing expenses, quarterly labor rates, factory overhead, and short-term
financial expenses. Additionally, the record failed to show Commerce included expenses such as
research and development, long-term financial expenses, and taxes on steel imports. Id.
266. Id. at 1551. Commerce and FNV, defendant-intervenor, contested Budd Company's
allegations on two grounds: (1) that Budd's argument concerning failure to fully account for inflation
was without merit; and (2) that Budd Company had ample opportunity to raise these issues at the
administrative level and failure to do so prevented Budd Company from raising them on appeal. Id.
at 1552.
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account for the full inflationary effects on all costs.267
Additionally, Budd Company wanted Commerce to supplement the
administrative record in order to more completely detail its
findings.268 However, the CIT was disinclined to remand the case
after previously holding that Commerce's methodology was
proper.269
The CIT held that there was substantial evidence to support
Commerce's accounting of V NY's costs.270 The court questioned
whether a full accounting of the impact of inflation on costs was
necessary or even possible.27' Additionally, the court concluded
that because Budd Company failed to raise these concerns at the
administrative level, they were prevented from raising them for the
first time before the CIT. 272  Commerce's Amended Final
Determination was once again upheld in its entirety by the
Court.
27 3
While Budd Company was appealing Commerce's Amended
Final Determination, Borlem and FNV were attempting to have the
ITC reconsider the threat of material injury determination. Borlem
and FNV appealed the ITC's findings at the same time they were
involved in defending Commerce's Amended Final Determination.
Borlem was especially interested in having the injury determination
reversed because Customs was still assessing the antidumping duty
267. Id. at 1552.
268. Id.
269. 773 F. Supp. at 1554. The court stated:
A review of Commerce's methodology yields the conclusion that the amended final
determination is fair, consistent with statutorily prescribed procedures, and substantiated
by the administrative record. This Court reached the same conclusion in its opinion dated
September 5, 1990, dismissing Plaintiffs motion for partial judgment upon the agency
record and sustaining the determination as amended through a circumstances of sale
adjustment. Id.
270. Id. at 1554.
271. Id. The court stated:
The glaring deficiency in Plaintiff's argument is the underlying premise that full
accounting for inflation is necessary or even possible. Plaintiff has never explained how
this is so or why Commerce's replacement costlconstructed value methodology does not
adequately account for the effects of inflation on the costs of producing TSDWs in Brazil.
... Again, the Court defers to the findings of the Commerce Department. Id.
272. Id. at 1555.
273. Id. at 1556.
232
1992 / The Case of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil
on Borlem's imports to the United States.27 4 Although the two
appeals of Commerce's Amended Final Determination stayed
execution of court orders regarding the ITC's findings, the parties
nevertheless litigated the threat of material injury findings before
the CIT and CAFC.
V. BORLEM AND FNV APPEAL
THE ITC's FINAL INVESTIGATION
A. First Appeal to the CIT
The first appeal of the ITC's Final Investigation was made to
the CIT after Commerce produced its Amended Final
Determination.27 Borlem and FNV requested that the ITC
reconsider its finding that there was an imminent threat of material
injury to the U.S. TSDW industry in light of Commerce's
Amended Final Determination that FNV's dumping margin was de
minimis.276 The ITC supported the motion for remand, provided
the court remanded on jurisdictional grounds rather than based on
the merits of the case.277 Budd Company opposed the motion for
remand on several grounds. 7
Borlem and FNV's theory on remand was proper in this case
based, in part, on an extension of the ITC's customary practice.279
The ITC had a long standing practice of excluding from an original
274. If the ITC found that there was no injury to a U.S. industry, Customs would stop assessing
an antidumping duty against Borlem. Borlem hoped that Commerce's finding that FNV's dumping
margin was de minimis would force the ITC to conclude that no injury was occurring. Then, even
though Borlem still had a dumping margin of 10.64% it would escape an antidumping duty because
both dumping and injury are required to assess an antidumping duty.
275. Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 710 F. Supp. 797 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989) (Budd Company was defendant-intervenor).
276. Id. at 798. Reconsideration by the ITC was especially important to Borlem. If the ITC felt
that, by itself, Borlem's dumping did not constitute an imminent threat of material injury to U.S.
manufacturers, then Borlem would not be assessed an antidumping duty. The court stated that "[the
case] raises questions of law and administrative policy and practice related to the Commission's role
in the bifurcated scheme established by Congress for administration of the antidumping... laws. Id.
at 800.
277. See infra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
278. See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
279. 710 F. Supp. at 800.
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final injury determination data on a firm that Commerce had
excluded from its analysis in completing Commerce's original
Final Determination.2 0 Borlem and FNV were asking the CIT to
remand the case to the ITC so that it could consider whether a
reconsideration of its findings was necessary and proper in light of
Commerce's exclusion of FNV from its Amended Final
Determination.21 Borlem and FNV believed that because the ITC
would have excluded FNV from its injury analysis if Commerce
had excluded it from its original Final Determination, the ITC
should exclude FNV in view of Commerce's Amended Final
Determination that FNV's dumping margins were de minimis. 2
Borlem and FNV felt that the ITC should have an opportunity to
determine if it should extend its long standing practice to the facts
of this case.
2 3
The ITC did not oppose the motion for remand, provided the
remand order did not go to the substance of whether the ITC
should reconsider its decision.2" The ITC listed some of the
issues affecting its decision to reconsider its findings: the timing
and finality of agency decisions; the possibility of undue disruption
of international trade; the efficient use of scarce administrative
resources; and the probability of similar issues arising in the
future.2 5 Therefore, the ITC argued that due to its specialized
expertise on issues of material injury, it was in the best position to
judge whether the results of the Amended Final Determination
should affect the ITC's findings.286
280. Id.; see, e.g., Certain Granite from Italy and Spain, USITC Pub. 2110, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-
381,382, at 23 n.88 (Aug. 1988) (final); Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, USITC Pub.
1970, Inv. No. 731-TA-326, at 24 n.89 (Apr. 1987) (final); Top-of-the Stove Stainless Steel Cooking
Ware from Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1936, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-267, 268, at 10 n.25 (Jan. 1987)
(final); Certain Red Raspberries from Canada, US1TC Pub. 1707, Inv. No. 731-TA-196, at 8 n.30
(June 1985) (final). Id.
281. 710 F. Supp. at 800.
282. Id. at 800-01.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 801 n.6. The ITC stated in its brief to the CIT that "[t]he Commission's non-
opposition to the current motion entails that it has not yet deliberated on and decided whether
reconsideration should occur. Defendant's Response at 14-15." IC
285. Id. at 801 n.7. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text (statutory time frame for
rapidly deciding dumping cases).
286. 710 F. Supp. 797, 801 (CL Int'l Trade 1989).
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Budd Company, as defendant-intervenor, raised three arguments
in opposition to the motion for remand.287 First, Budd Company
challenged the CIT's power to remand the case by arguing that the
court's scope of review was limited to judgment on the agency
record.288 Second, Budd Company asserted that there was no
reason to remand the case to the ITC to reconsider its findings
based on the specialized expertise of the ITC.219 Third, Budd
Company felt that the extraordinary remedy of remand was not
warranted by the facts of this case.2"
The issue before the CIT was whether, under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction,29 the court should remand a case involving
hybrid legal and policy questions of first impression to the
ITC.2  Specifically, did the CIT have the discretionary power
to defer to the ITC, allowing the ITC to make the first
determination of whether it could reconsider its findings in light of
Commerce's Amended Final Determination?293 The court began




290. Id. The court noted,
Budd also argues that the proper mechanism for plaintiffs to obtain relief in this case is
a review under section 751(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930,19 U.S.C. § 1675(b) (1982 Supp.
V 1987), and that Borlem's motion should be treated as a request that the ITC be
permitted to make a new determination due to "'changed circumstances." Id.
291. The CIT explained the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as follows:
'Primary jurisdiction is a doctrine of common law, wholly court-made, that is designed
to guide a court in determining whether and when it should refrain from or postpone the
exercise of its own jurisdiction so that an agency may frst answer some question
presented." Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 81 (2nd Ed., Vol 4, 1983). The central
purpose of the doctrine is to give effect to legislative intent underlying the established
regulatory scheme by referring matters involving agency expertise back to the agency so
that it may, in the first instance, pass upon the issue from its unique administrative
perspective.
710 F. Supp. at 799-800; see United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956) (where the
Supreme Court outlined the doctrine's parameters).
292. 710 F. Supp. at 799. In discussing its remand powers the court stated, "IThis Court has
significant powers in law and equity to remand to the administrative agency when circumstances
require. Congress specifically granted this Court the power to remand in the Customs Courts Act of
1980." Iti (citation omitted) The court's remand authority is co-extensive to that of other federal
district courts. Id
293. Id. at 802.
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findings were unsupported by substantial evidence on the record,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.294 The CIT felt that
by sending the issue back for the ITC's review, it was neither
extending nor abdicating its jurisdiction., The court stated that
after the ITC had concluded its analysis upon remand, they would
review the ITC's actions to ensure they were made in accordance
with law.296 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the ITC
for further consideration in light of Commerce's Amended Final
Determination.
29 7
B. The ITC's Decision on Remand from CIT
On remand from the CIT, the ITC held that it could not address
the issue of reconsidering its finding that imports of TSDWs posed
a threat of material injury to a U.S. industry.298 The ITC framed
the question before remand as whether anything explicit in the
statutes, or implicit in the administration of antidumping
investigations, led to the conclusion that Congress intended
subsequent amendments in Commerce's determinations to affect the
ITC's f'mdings.2' The ITC opined that the failure to authorize the
ITC to reconsider final investigations reflected Congress' intent that
the ITC administer injury determinations in a timely fashion.3"
294. Id. at 799 (19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)). The CIT further stated, "The Court must give
substantial weight to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers." 1, (citing American
Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 992, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
295. Id.
296. 710 F. Supp. at 799. As the court stated earlier in the opinion, "The standard of review
in antidumping cases is whether on the basis of the administrative record before the Court the agency
action is 'unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.- 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982)." Id
297. Id. at 802.
298. Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil: Views on Remand, USITC Pub. 2179, Inv. No.
731-TA-335 (1989) (fimal) [hereinafter 1TC on Remand].
299. Id. (discussing whether amendments by Commerce would make the 1TC's findings
unsupported by substantial evidence when reviewed by the CTI).
300. Id. (except in cases involving fraud during the investigation). The ITC stated:
We conclude that Congress did not intend for such matters to be the basis for a
reconsideration by the Commission. We base this conclusion on the relevant statutes,
taking into consideration the nature and structure of the statutory process for the conduct
of antidumping investigations, and the interests of finality and equity, as well as the
consequences for the efficient administration of antidumping investigations if matters such
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Noting that Congress expressly granted Commerce the authority to
reconsider final determinations, the ITC found that the absence of
such authority prohibited it from reconsidering final
investigations."'
The ITC bolstered its opinion with the argument that the strict
time deadlines for concluding investigations supported its statutory
interpretation."°  The ITC believed reconsideration of its final
investigation would run counter to the statutory language and
legislative intent of Congress. 3 Finally, the ITC stated concern
over the burden on administrative resources and expenses to parties
involved in the investigation should the ITC begin reconsidering
final investigations.3 4 The 1TC concluded it lacked authority to
reconsider its final investigations. Therefore, the ITC refused to
address the question of whether a reconsideration of its threat of
material injury finding was necessary in light of Commerce's
Amended Final Determination. However, the ITC's determination
was not the final word on this issue as Borlem and FNV had the
right to appeal this finding to the CIT.
C. The Second Appeal to the CIT of the ITC's Decision
The ITC's determination that it lacked the authorization to
reconsider its- injury findings forced Borlem and FNV to again
appeal to the CIT, asking the court to set aside the ITC's remand
determination.3 5 The CIT began its analysis by reiterating that it
as these are remanded to the Commission. Id.
301. ]TC on Remand, supra note 298 (19 U.S.C. § 1673d(e) provides Commerce reasonable
time to correct errors in final determinations).
302. Id. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(2) (providing the deadlines for 1TC findings after
Commerce's final determinations). The ITC stated:
Congress created a complex, but rapid, system for the administration of antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. The system imposes strict time limits and bifurcates the decisions
necessary for the imposition of duties between the Commission and Commerce. The structure
requires each agency to rely on the peculiar competence of the other.
ITC on Remand, supra note 298.
303. Id. (The 1TC felt Congress wanted antidumping duty cases decided quickly).
304. Id. (The ITC also felt finality in its decisions was intended by Congress).
305. Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 41,42 (CL Int'l
Trade 1989) (the ITC and defendant-intervenor Budd Company opposed the motion) (hils was the
second CIT opinion on this subject in three months).
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had broad powers in equity to remand a case when required to
achieve fundamental fairness.'06 Although limited to reviewing
the administrative record before it, the court was also required to
take judicial notice of other administrative decisions such as
Commerce's Amended Final Determination.3 7 Borlem and FNV
requested that the CIT take judicial notice of Amended Final
Determination that FN'Vs dumping margin was de minimis."8
After taking judicial notice of Commerce's Amended Final
Determination, the CIT found that if the ITC had been aware of
that FNV's dumping margin was de minimis, it might have reached
a different finding on the threat of material injury. 9 The court
then had to establish the legal basis for allowing the ITC to
reconsider its final decision.
The first question before the CIT was whether the ITC, on
remand from the court, could reconsider its threat of material injury
determination.31 The CIT found the ITC's administrative findings
on remand to be unreasonable and not a permissible construction
of the antidumping statutes.3 ' Therefore, the CIT held that the
306. Id. at 46 (CIT's remand authority coextensive with other federal district courts).
307. Id. (CiT's authority to take judicial notice of other agency's decisions) (citing FED. I.
EVID. 201; Calm v. United States, 152 U.S. 211, 221-22 (1894); 10 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 201.02(1) (2d ed. 1988)). CIT is limited to reviewing administrative record. 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(b)(1)(B)).
308. 718 F. Supp. at 46.
309. Id. The CIT stated:
Hence it seems clear that had the ITC known at the time it made its affirmative
threat of injury determination that FNV, the major manufacturer of TSDWs imported from
Brazil, was not dumping or had de minimis dumping margins, there is a very strong
possibility the ITC would have found no injury ... based upon material and significant
inaccurate facts. Id
310. Id. at 42.
311. Id. at 48 (exceptional holding given the great deference usually shown agency
determinations). The CIT stated:
While the ITC majority [ma its reconsideration proceedings] properly pointed out that
Congress wanted dumping and countervailing duty cases to be handled speedily and was
willing to accept as a trade off for speed less than complete records, there has been no
showing that Congress had no concern for accuracy. The mere fact that Congress was
willing to grant the ITC authority to make determinations on the 'best information'
available, should not be interpreted as authorizing proceedings that are so flawed with
inaccurate facts that different results would obtain if accurate facts were used. Congress
although providing no explicit administrative procedure in the Act for the ITC to review
its final determinations.., did, nevertheless, make specific provisions forjudicial review.
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ITC had the authority to reconsider a final decision when directed
to do so by the court on remand." The court stated that despite
the lack of statutory authorization to reconsider final decisions,
remand from the CIT provided a vehicle for both the ITC and
Commerce to reconsider final decisions.313 However, the court
stated that the exercise of the ITC's power to reconsider final
decisions was within the ITC's discretion.314 Having decided that
the ITC had authorization to reconsider its final material threat of
injury decision, the court had to provide a framework for the ITC's
reconsideration.
The second question was whether the ITC should reconsider its
findings based on Commerce's Amended Final Determination in
this case. 5 The CIT felt it vital for the ITC to address the issue
of whether a reconsideration of the injury finding was warranted in
light of FNV's de minimis dumping margin. 6 However, the CIT
stated that the ITC's decision whether to reconsider its final
decision was within the ITC's discretion. 17 The court stated that
if the JTC determined that it should reconsider its final decision,
then the CIT's remand authority provided the mechanism for the
ITC."' However, if the ITC determined that it should not
reconsider its final decision, then it was directed to set forth the
reasons why reconsideration of its final decision was not
warranted.
319
The CIT's ruling raised the possibility that on remand the ITC
would reconsider its final decision, and find that TSDWs from
Brazil posed no threat of material injury. The ITC was concerned
about the impact of this decision on future dumping cases. Budd
Company had the more immediate concern that a reconsideration
IdE; see 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a).
312. 718 F. Supp. at 49.
313. Id at 48.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1).
314. 718 F. Supp. at 48.
315. Id.
316. Id. (ITC maintains discretion in actually changing its injury determination after
reconsideration).
317. Ld. at 49.
318. Id.
319. 718 F. Supp. at 49.
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by the ITC would lead to the elimination of the antidumping duty
still being charged against Borlem.320 Therefore, both the ITC
and Budd Company had reason to appeal the CIT's ruling to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.32
D. The ITC and Budd Company Appeal to the CAFC
The ITC and Budd Company filed an interlocutory appeal of
the CIT's decision to the CAFC.322 Therefore, pending the
outcome of the appeal, the ITC made no decision regarding
reconsideration of its injury findings. The CAFC certified two
issues to be heard on appeal from the CIT.
The first question presented to the CAFC was whether the
CIT's remand authority provided a sufficient basis for the ITC to
reconsider whether imports of TSDWs from Brazil pose a material
threat of injury to the U.S. TSDW industry in light of Commerce's
Amended Final Determination.323 The ITC argued that the CIT
failed to show the proper deference to the Commission's findings
of material injury.324 The CAFC noted that the CIT showed the
proper deference to the ITC's administrative agency ruling, but that
the CIT must not defer to an agency where the agency's
interpretation is unreasonable. 3' Additionally, the CAFC
320. Without a finding of imminent threat of material injury, there would be no grounds on
which to assess a duty against Borlem even though Commerce had found Borlem was dumping
TSDWs into the U.S. market. Additionally, a finding of material injury would make it possible to
reassess an antidumping duty on FNV if Commerce's Amended Final Determination was overturned.
321. Seesupra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (explaining the appeals process for dumping
and countervailing duty cases).
322. Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 913 F.2d 933, 936 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(1) (1982)).
323. Id. at 936 (remand authority based on 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1) and warranted because of
the Amended Final Determination that FNV's dumping margins were de minimis).
324. Id. at 937 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (the
ITC's finding will be upheld if "sufficiently reasonable").
325. Id. at 937. The CAFC expressly noted that 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (1980),
[Bixpressly provides that when, 'the Court of International Trade is unable to determine
the correct decision on the basis of the evidence in any civil action, the court... may
order such further administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers
necessary. . . .' Since the trial court did not premise its authority on this provision, we
will comment on it no further other than to indicate its possible applicability to this case.
See Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 739 F.2d 628, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (omissions in
240
1992 / The Case of Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil
reasoned that Congress' policy of timely determinations in dumping
cases was not an authorization for the ITC to reach conclusions
premised on inaccurate data.3 26 As the court noted, the law does
not require, nor should it require, the reliance by ITC on erroneous
data leading to an erroneous result.327 Finally, the CAFC stated
that deference to an administrative agency's findings should not
apply when the issue is the scope of the agency's authority.
328
Because the CIT acted within the scope of its powers and did not
impose the court's views into the administrative process, the CIT's
remand to the ITC was proper.329
The ITC asserted several other arguments before the CAFC in
support of its view that the CIT should not remand cases to the
ITC after a final threat of material injury finding had been reached.
First, the ITC interpreted the governing statutes as requiring that all
findings be reached within the timetables provided by statute.330
The CAFC found that the statutes did not address reconsideration
of final decisions, and that it would be inconsistent with the role of
judicial review to prohibit reconsideration.33' Second, the ITC
argued that Congress had expressly authorized Commerce to
correct ministerial errors while failing to authorize the ITC to do
so.3 32 The CAFC stated that congressional authorization for
Commerce to correct ministerial errors was not tantamount to
prohibiting the 1TC from correcting substantive errors based on
inaccurate data.333 Third, both the ITC and Budd Company
original). Id. at n.4.
326. Id. at 937 ('Threat of injury determination made on faulty premise that Commerce found
both Borlem and FNV to be dumping, when in fact FNV's dumping was de minimis).
327. 913 F.2d at 937.
328. Id. (citing Social See. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946)).
329. 913 F.2d at 937-38.
330. Id. at 938 (citing 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(b)(1), 1673d(a) (1980)).
331. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988)).
332. 913 F.2d at938 (citing Commerce's authorization under 19U.S.C. §§ 1671d(e), 1673d(e)).
333. Id. Furthermore, the IrC objected to the CIT's citation of an ITC regulation 19 C.F.R. §
207.46 (1989) which stated that the IC shall have inherent authority to issue modifications,
clarifications, or correction ofa determination within a reasonable time from the date of issuance. The
ITC argued that the regulation was meant to apply only to non-substantive errors. The CAFC agreed
with the CIT that the regulation need not be read so narrowly. However, the CAFC found it
unnecessary to interpret the regulation as the issue before the Court was the authority of the CIT to
require reconsideration on remand. Id.
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argued that the CIT should not base its remand on information
contained in Commerce's Amended Final Determination that was
itself the subject of a separate appeal." The CAFC stated that
the CIT was apprised of the status of Commerce's Amended Final
Determination, and it was not legal error for the CIT to require the
ITC to reconsider its findings on remand.335
The CAFC agreed with the CIT's interpretation of the statute
and legislative history giving the CIT broad remand authority co-
extensive with other federal district courts. 3 6 Therefore, the CIT
properly utilized its remand authority by having the ITC reconsider,
as a question of first impression, whether the ITC's final material
injury findings should be reviewed because of Commerce's
Amended Final Determination. Having disposed of the main issue,
the CAFC addressed the second question involving the amount of
discretion the ITC could exercise in determining whether to
reconsider the threat of material injury determination.
The second issue before the CAFC was whether the CIT
properly left the decision of whether or not to reconsider the ITC's
material injury findings within the discretion of the ITC.337
Interestingly, it was Borlem and FNV who argued that the CIT
erred in ordering the ITC to use its discretion in determining
whether the material injury determination should be
reconsidered. 3 8 The CAFC noted that the CIT's order was non-
discretionary to the extent it required the ITC to reconsider
whether, in its discretion, the injury determinations should be
334. Id. at 939-41 (ITC concemed about the possibility of "endless renvoi") (Budd Company
concerned over status of its appeal of Commerce's Amended Final Determination. That appeal was
decided by the CIT on September 5, 1990, one day prior to the CAFC decision on this appeal).
Additionally, the ITC was concerned by the CTs reliance on Commerce's Amended Final
Determination which was outside the ITC's administrative record. The ITC cited the fact that the
court was not to conduct a trial de novo. But the CAFC ruled that, "a reviewing court is not
precluded under this standard from considering events which have occurred between the date of an
agency (or trial court) decision and the date of decision on appeal." Id. at 939.
335. Id. at 941.
336. Id. at 936-37 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2643; H.R. REP. No. 1235,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, 61,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7088, 7114).
337. 913 F.2d at 936, 941.
338. Id. at 942 (Obviously Borlem and FNV did not wish to win the remand battle only to lose
the injury deternination war by having the ITC in its discretion decide reconsideration was
unnecessary).
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amended.339 However, the CAFC reasoned that if the CIT had
remand authority to order the ITC to reconsider, the CIT had the
authority to allow the ITC discretion upon remand." ° Therefore,
the CIT's order granting the ITC discretion in determining whether
reconsideration of the threat of injury finding was upheld.34'
The CAFC ordered the ITC to reconsider whether the final
determination that imports into the United States by Borlem and
FNV materially threatened U.S. industry. However, the court stayed
execution of its order pending the outcome of the second appeal to
the CIT of Commerce's Amended Final Determination.342 After
the ruling on the second appeal of the Amended Final
Determination was announced, the ITC published a notice that it
was reopening its investigation as ordered by the CAFC.34 3 To
date, the ITC has not completed and published the results of its
court ordered review. Nevertheless, the importance of this case lies
not in the final outcome, but in the legal precedent established
regarding Commerce's application of the circumstances of sales
adjustment and the CIT's remand authority.
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Legal Ramiflcations of Cases Relating to Commerce
The facts of this case required Commerce and the courts to
examine whether Commerce's replacement accounting for costs
accurately captured all of Borlem's and FNV's costs. Additionally,
this case brought into question the rules regarding calculation of
foreign market value. Finally, the circumstances of sales adjustment
339. Id. at 941.
340. Id. (ITC did argue the discretion issue maintaining only that the CIT had no power to
remand).
341. Id. at 942 (CAFC remanded for proceedings consistent with its holding).
342. Notices of Remand Proceedings, Tubeless Steel Disc Wheels from Brazil, 56 Fed. Reg.
49,904-01 (Oct. 2, 1991) (Inv. No. 731-TA-335) (court remand); see supra notes 242-74 and
accompanying text (providing details of second appeal of Amended Final Determination).
343. Id. (briefs due October 9,1991). The notice stated that, "No new factual material may be
submitted to the Commission other than that relating to the impact of the exclusion of imports of
tubeless steel disc wheels from the Brazilian supplier, FNV." Id.
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utilized by Commerce to accurately compare Brazilian foreign
market value and costs with U.S. price and costs was questioned on
the grounds that Commerce was engaged in making new rules
without proper authorization from Congress. These issues were
fundamental to properly assessing the dumping margins, if any, of
Borlem and FNV. The answer to these questions had a direct
impact on Brazilian and U.S. manufacturers as well as U.S.
consumers of TSDWs.
Commerce's replacement cost method for calculating costs in
a hyperinflationary economy was found to be a fundamentally
sound policy. The determination that the sales date rather than the
shipment date would be used to convert Brazilian currency into
dollars in order to compare foreign market value with U.S. price
was also found to be the proper interpretation of the governing
statutes and regulations. However, due to the long delays between
the sales date and shipment date for TSDWs, Commerce felt it
necessary to employ a circumstances of sale adjustment to offset
the effects of hyperinflation and devaluation of the Brazilian
currency. On appeal to the CIT, the fundamental question for the
court was the propriety of this circumstances of sale adjustment.
Was Commerce engaged in rule making when it implemented the
adjustment, or was Commerce empowered to utilize an adjustment
in this case to reach an accurate result?
The CIT held that it was within Commerce's discretion to
adjust the normal procedure for converting foreign currency into
U.S. dollars. Normally, the circumstances of sale adjustment is
designed to compensate for factors directly related to the sale of
products to the United States. However, the CIT stated that
Commerce's primary function was to compare costs and prices at
a common point along the distribution chain. The delay between
the sales date and shipment date distorted Commerce's calculation
of Borlem's and FNV's foreign market value. Because
reverberations from Brazil's hyperinflation affected the sale of
TSDWs to the United States, a circumstances of sale adjustment
was proper under these circumstances. The adjustment resulted in
a finding that FNV's dumping margin was de minimis.
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The circumstances of sales adjustment used in this case can be
utilized by other importers from countries experiencing
hyperinflation. " When foreign firms can show that
hyperinflation affected the calculation of foreign market value,
other firms can benefit in the same fashion as FNV. If dumping
margins are reduced due to a circumstances of sale adjustment, the
possibility exists that the ITC will not find a threat of material
injury to a U.S. industry.
This case also introduced the broader concept that any general
economic condition may trigger a circumstances of sale adjustment
if that condition impacts the goods under investigation. Although
the CIT attempted to narrow the case's holding to the particular
facts, exporters from countries experiencing systemic economic
difficulties could argue that the general conditions in their
economies justify a circumstances of sale adjustment as well.
Potentially, Commerce or the CIT could broaden the scope of the
circumstances of sale adjustment to offset general economic
conditions in exporting countries.
B. Legal Ramifications of Cases Relating to the ITC
The cases involving the ITC raised legal and policy issues of
first impression concerning the remand authority of the CIT. The
CAFC found that the CIT was an Article I court possessing the
same remand authority in law and equity as any other Article III
court. Therefore, based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
the CIT had the authority to remand this case to the ITC so that it
could determine whether a reconsideration of its final injury finding
was warranted. Based upon the remand authority of the CIT, the
ITC was required to consider reviewing the threat of material
injury finding despite a lack of statutory authorization.
Commerce's dumping determinations and the ITC's material
injury findings are interrelated. If Commerce alters an amended
final dumping determination, the CIT will require the ITC to
consider reviewing the injury finding. Commerce's finding of a de
344. E.g., Argentina, Israel, and Bolivia.
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minimis dumping margin by FNV opened the door to a
reexamination of the material injury determination for all TSDWs
imported into the United States. The CIT and CAFC agreed that
Congress' desire to have prompt administrative resolution of
dumping cases did not override the congressional policy of
reaching just results.
Borlem v. United States 5 established that the CIT does have
the authority to remand cases to the ITC and Commerce. However,
in this case, the CIT's order on remand left the final substantive
decisions within the discretion of the ITC. The CAFC upheld the
CIT's decision to leave substantive matters within the purview of
the ITC. The CIT is understandably hesitant to substitute the
court's judgment for that of one of the administrative agencies
charged by Congress to administer U.S. antidumping laws. A party
must assert that the administrative agency's findings are based on
some extrinsic mistake or misunderstanding in order to have the
CIT order a new investigation based on its remand authority.
Nevertheless, the CIT's remand authority is a new tool available to
parties seeking to correct errors by either the ITC or
Commerce.4 6
Counsel representing foreign manufacturers should cite this case
for the proposition that any reduction in the dumping margin
calculation by Commerce mandates that the ITC consider reviewing
the threat of material injury determination. All parties before the
ITC should argue that there are no cut-off points in the injury
determination process because the goal of the proceedings is to
reach fair and accurate results. Therefore, the ITC should consider
reopening an investigation whenever Commerce reports any
amended findings. If the ITC fails to adopt new procedures for
reopening investigations in light of new findings by Commerce,
counsel should appeal to the CIT seeking an order to force the ITC
to reconsider its threat of material injury finding.
345. 718 F. Supp. 41 (1989), aftd, 913 F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (upholding CIT's remand
authority).
346. However, in the only case citing Borlem the CIT sought to limit the holding to the
"peculiar" facts of the case. Trent Tube Div. v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 468,476 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1990) (no allegations of ITC mistake as in Boriem).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The series of administrative proceedings and court appeals
involving Borlem, FNV, and the Budd Company are illustrative of
the complex legal, economic, and policy issues associated with
dumping cases. The determinations made in every dumping case
are based on the distinct circumstances of the foreign and domestic
manufacturers, the foreign and domestic markets, and the general
economic conditions in the countries involved. Because the cases
involve foreign manufacturers operating in a foreign economy, it
is often difficult to gather and analyze all the data necessary to
reach a correct decision. In the case of TSDWs from Brazil, it was
especially difficult for Commerce and the CIT to accurately assess
the impact of hyperinflation in Brazil on Borlem and FNV.
However, through the use of CIT's remand authority, the parties
will have an opportunity to have their case decided on the most
accurate data available. In the future, the CIT's remand authority
should be utilized whenever necessary to reach a fair and accurate
result.
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